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 “EQUAL CITIZENSHIP STATURE”: 
JUSTICE GINSBURG’S 
CONSTITUTIONAL VISION 
NEIL S. SIEGEL 
Abstract: In this essay, Professor Siegel examines the nature and function of 
constitutional visions in the American constitutional order. He argues that 
Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg possesses such a vision and that her 
vision is defined by her oft-stated commitment to “full human stature,” to 
“equal citizenship stature.” He then defends Justice Ginsburg’s 
characteristically incremental and moderate approach to realizing her vision. 
He does so in part by establishing that President Barack Obama articulated a 
similar vision and approach in his Philadelphia speech on American race 
relations and illustrated its capacity to succeed during the 2008 presidential 
election. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg has served on the Supreme 
Court of the United States for more than fifteen years. The passage of time 
provides good reason to take pause and reflect on her contributions to the 
development of the law. I commend the editors of the New England Law 
Review for marking this occasion with a symposium in her honor. 
I shall train my attention on the progressive constitutional vision that I 
believe animates Justice Ginsburg’s understanding of our Constitution. In 
several areas of constitutional law, her overarching vision is concisely 
captured by a phrase to which she often returns, both on and off the bench. 
Our Constitution, in Justice Ginsburg’s view, guarantees “equal citizenship 
stature.”1 Its majestic and open-ended language is best read aspirationally 
and expansively: Each generation of Americans advances the constitutional 
design by slowly but surely coming to comprehend such commitments as 
“the equal protection of the laws”2 to include within their embrace groups 
who previously did not count in constituting “the People”3 for whom the 
Constitution purports to speak. Justice Ginsburg’s Constitution not only 
constitutes; it also reconstitutes. It empowers persons by including them in 
core activities associated with citizenship, and it includes persons by 
empowering them—and it accomplishes more of both over time. In so 
doing, our Constitution makes good on its declaration of intent “to form a 
more perfect Union.”4 
In this essay, I pay tribute to Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional vision. 
I begin by examining the general role that constitutional visions play in the 
American constitutional order. I pursue this question both from the 
perspective of the judiciary and, more importantly, from the perspective of 
the American public. I suggest that successful visions partially integrate the 
domains of constitutional politics and constitutional law, thereby rendering 
the countermajoritarian difficulty less difficult in practice. 
I next focus on Justice Ginsburg’s vision in particular. Drawing from 
her judicial opinions and other public pronouncements, I show that her 
vision lends coherence and depth to a potentially distinct set of 
 
 1. See infra Part II (detailing many instances in which Justice Ginsburg uses this or 
similar language). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 3. U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
 4. Id. 
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constitutional commitments. Justice Ginsburg’s approach provides an 
affirmative—indeed, heroic—answer to the question whether there is such 
a thing as a progressive constitutional vision. 
Finally, I explore the politics of persuasion that must be reckoned 
with by Americans who seek to realize something like Justice Ginsburg’s 
inclusive vision. In approaching this difficult subject, I focus on the 
example set by President Barack Obama during the 2008 presidential 
campaign. Analyzing his Philadelphia speech on race relations in America, 
I observe that our nation’s forty-fourth President appears to espouse a 
constitutional vision that is similar to Justice Ginsburg’s. I further note that 
President Obama seems to share Justice Ginsburg’s general approach to 
realizing her constitutional vision—namely, a tendency to favor 
incrementalism and moderation. This tendency, I suggest, stems not from 
cowardice or indecision, but from a constitutional vision that relies on—
and seeks to empower—ordinary Americans to realize constitutional 
change, and that views our Constitution as a work in progress and not as an 
already perfected document. I suggest that the substance, style, and 
electoral success of President Obama’s aspirational politics may have much 
to offer Americans who share Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional 
commitments and who work to make them a governing reality in our 
national politics and our constitutional law. I also suggest that President 
Obama’s approach calls into question progressive criticism of Justice 
Ginsburg as an excessively cautious jurist. 
DISCUSSION 
I. The Function of Constitutional Visions 
Before turning to Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional vision in 
particular, I will begin with the general idea of a constitutional vision. 
Much progressive legal scholarship uses the term “constitutional vision” 
without defining it.5 This may be because it is a difficult concept to pin 
down. In this Part, I offer a rough account of the nature and function of a 
constitutional vision. 
A striking aspect of the decision making of the early Roberts Court is 
the near-perfect extent to which the Justices can be grouped into the same 
ideological blocks in certain deeply divisive cases. Such cases are well 
described by Anthony Kronman’s notion of “identity-defining” conflicts, 
so named because the choices they require “define the community that 
makes them in the same way that some personal choices define the 
 
 5. See, for example, many of the contributions in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020 (Jack M. 
Balkin & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2009). 
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individual who does.”6 For example, in constitutional litigation involving 
government regulation of abortion,7 race and equal protection,8 the 
meaning and scope of the Second Amendment,9 eligibility for the death 
penalty,10 the detention or trial of alleged enemy combatants,11 campaign 
finance legislation,12 federal laws aimed at protecting the environment,13 
and the domestic judicial enforceability of international law,14 four 
Justices—Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—
almost always agree with one another. Likewise, four other Justices—
Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer—almost always agree with 
one another. And Justice Kennedy (who, it is relevant to note, was 
President Reagan’s third choice) proves decisive by agreeing with one side 
or the other. In cases implicating these profound questions of personal and 
collective identity, this 5-4 or 4-1-4 fracture best characterizes the Roberts 
 
 6. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 88-89 (1993) (“In the political sphere, as in the personal, there are some choices 
that have what I call identity-defining consequences.”); id. at 90 (“[T]hose controversies that 
happen at any moment to be the most lively and important ones in a community—those with 
the largest implications for its direction and destiny—often present conflicts among values 
that reflect incomparable visions of what is most worthy in the community’s current 
practices or future possibilities . . . .”). 
 7. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1619 (2007). 
 8. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 
2741-43 (2007); cf. Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S.Ct. 2658 (2009) (dividing 5-4 over whether a 
city violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by discarding the results of an exam 
used to identify firefighters best qualified to fill vacant lieutenant and captain positions 
when the results of the exam showed that white candidates had significantly outperformed 
minority candidates). 
 9. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2787-88 (2008). 
 10. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650-51 (2008). 
 11. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2240 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 
U.S. 557, 572-73 (2006). 
 12. See, e.g., Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 128 S. Ct. 2759 (2008); Federal 
Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007). 
 13. See, e.g., Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006). Rapanos was technically a 
statutory case, but the statutory analyses took place in the shadow of the Constitution. The 
plurality invoked federalism concerns and constitutional avoidance. Id. at 737-38. 
Moreover, Justice Kennedy wrote of the test he would use that “in most cases regulation of 
wetlands that are adjacent to tributaries and possess a significant nexus with navigable 
waters will raise no serious constitutional or federalism difficulty.” Id. at 782 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in judgment). 
 14. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1349 (2008); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 
548 U.S. 331, 337 (2006). 
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Court, which is why it is often called the Kennedy Court.15 It is not merely 
that the views of the Justices within each block are positively correlated 
across these issue areas. The Justices can, almost without exception,16 be 
counted on to agree with the other members of their voting block on all of 
these issues—and, in all likelihood, others as well.17 As Christopher 
Eisgruber recently noted with only modest overstatement, “If you tell me 
where a justice stands on abortion, I can tell you what that justice’s position 
is on affirmative action, gun control, criminal procedure, federalism and 
other privacy issues.”18 
What best explains this degree of overlap in constitutional 
conclusions? One possibility is that these areas of constitutional litigation 
constitute distinct issues—a series of jurisprudential “silos”—so that the 
overlap is merely or mostly a coincidental consequence of the current 
composition of a court with only nine members. A more likely possibility is 
that identifiable forces are producing these results. For example, it might be 
the case that the Justices’ views in these areas of law are informed by 
distinct constitutional visions.19 
 
 15. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, When It Matters Most, It Is Still the Kennedy Court, 
11 GREEN BAG 2D 427 (2008). I do not discuss the voting behavior of Justice Sotomayor in 
this essay because she joined the Court only recently. 
 16. Medellín and Sanchez-Llamas are partial exceptions. In Medellín, Justice Stevens 
concurred in the judgment, expressing great sympathy for the dissenting views of Justices 
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer but voting on the same side as the other group of four. 
Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1372. In Sanchez-Llamas, Justice Ginsburg concurred in the 
judgment, joining only part of Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion, which Justices Stevens 
and Souter joined in full. Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 360, 365. 
 17. Controversies falling under the general heading of gay rights or church/state 
separation should also be included on any list of identity-defining conflicts. The Roberts 
Court has yet to render a decision concerning the extent to which the Constitution protects 
homosexuals from discrimination. Likewise, the Roberts Court has yet to render any 
Establishment Clause decisions. But cf. Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 127 S. 
Ct. 2553, 2567-68 (2007) (holding 5-4—along predictable ideological lines—that taxpayers 
do not have standing to assert an Establishment Clause claim against Executive Branch 
actions funded by general appropriations, as opposed to a specific congressional grant). 
 18. Adam Liptak, To Nudge, Shift, or Shove the Court Left, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2009, at 
WK4. Professor Eisgruber also noted the “surprising amount of ideological coherence on 
the court over the last 30 years.” Id. 
 19. It would be difficult to account for these voting blocs in terms of theories of 
constitutional interpretation. Seven Justices do not purport to possess a theory of 
interpretation, and the two that do (Justices Scalia and Thomas) do not always follow them. 
For example, it is not clear how the original public meaning of the First, Fifth, or Fourteenth 
Amendments compels (or even supports) the views of Justices Scalia and Thomas in racial 
equality, campaign finance, or commercial speech cases. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, 
Originalism is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 92 (2009) (The basis for Scalia’s and Thomas’s 
colorblindness “assertions was and is mysterious—at least for an announced (and 
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The significant underdeterminacy of our Constitution’s open-ended 
provisions20 establishes a contestable “realm of meaning” or “nomos.”21 A 
constitutional vision, in the general way that I use the term here, identifies 
these open-ended provisions with a set of values to which the national 
political community should aspire. A vision does so by providing a 
substantive account of how government power should be exercised and 
how individual rights should be protected in the American constitutional 
order. Such a vision provides a basic understanding of our Constitution—
its meaning and the purposes it is charged with accomplishing—that 
animates and integrates responses to a range of constitutional questions.22 
Constitutional visions can thus be thought of as an answer to the 
problem of issue bundling in law and politics. A vision identifies a set of 
values to which the adherent is presumptively committed. When the 
adherent perceives that these values are implicated in various contexts, he 
or she is moved consistently to hold certain views about how best to 
resolve questions arising in these contexts. Like a theory of constitutional 
interpretation, therefore, a constitutional vision can be deeply principled. 
A constitutional vision, however, is distinct from a theory of 
constitutional interpretation. While some jurists and commentators portray 
theories of constitutional interpretation as constraining judicial discretion,23 
 
proselytizing) Originalist. Not only does the constitutional text say no such thing . . . , but 
the best evidence of the original intentions is that the framers did not intend to 
constitutionalize a principle of strict colorblindness.” (footnotes omitted)); Neil S. Siegel, 
Umpires at Bat: On Integration and Legitimation, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 701, 718-19 (2007) 
(discussing the non-originalist character of their views in race cases); Lori A. Ringhand, 
Judicial Activism: An Empirical Examination of Voting Behavior on the Rehnquist Natural 
Court, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 43, 52-53 (2007) (discussing the non-originalist character of 
their views in First Amendment cases). Nor is Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Heller as 
originalist as it purports to be. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as 
Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 193 (2008) (“It is, to say the 
least, striking that an originalist interpretation of the Second Amendment would treat civic 
republican understandings of the amendment as antiquated, and refuse to protect the arms a 
militia needs to defend against tyranny.”). 
 20. For a discussion, see generally, for example, Siegel, supra note 19. 
 21. See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and 
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 28 (1983). 
 22. Cf., e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 
2836 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (referencing “different good-faith visions of our country 
and our Constitution”). 
 23. Thus, for example, Keith Whittington observes of originalists writing in the 1970s 
and 1980s: 
[O]riginalism was thought to limit the discretion of the judge. . . . By 
rooting judges in the firm ground of text, history, well-accepted 
historical traditions, and the like, originalists hoped to discipline them. 
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constitutional visions are not meant to constrain discretion, let alone yield 
logically determinate results in particular controversies. On the contrary, 
constitutional visions are meant to provide affirmative accounts of how 
power should (or should not) be utilized in order to achieve a set of 
normative ends that are asserted to be both central concerns of the 
Constitution and central concerns in the lives of citizens. Constitutional 
visions relate the one set of concerns to the other. 
Constitutional visions reflect the pervasive reality that the authority of 
the Constitution flows in part from its expression of enduring and evolving 
social values—from its status as the repository of our “fundamental nature 
as a people,” which “is sacred and demands our respectful 
acknowledgement.”24 Thus, Woodrow Wilson insisted that “the 
Constitution of the United States is not a mere lawyers’ document: it is a 
vehicle of life, and its spirit is always the spirit of the age.”25 Likewise, 
Franklin Roosevelt invoked the “original broad concept of the Constitution 
as a layman’s instrument of government.”26 By such statements, these 
Presidents meant that the Constitution must be understood as an expression 
of the deepest cultural values of our nation.27 Presidents may articulate 
constitutional visions,28 and the Justices they appoint may (explicitly or 
implicitly) possess constitutional visions as well. Indeed, the degree of  
 
 
 
 
The ‘political seduction of the law’ was a constant threat in a system 
that armed judges with the powerful weapon of judicial review, and the 
best response to that threat was to lash judges to the solid mast of 
history. 
Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 602 (2004). 
 24. Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Idea of a Constitution, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 167, 167, 169 
(1987). 
 25. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 69 
(Transaction Publishers 2002) (1908). 
 26. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Address in Washington, D.C.: The Constitution of the 
United States Was a Layman’s Document, Not a Lawyer’s Contract (Sept. 17, 1937), in 6 
THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 363 (Samuel I. Rosenman 
ed., 1941). 
 27. See Robert C. Post & Neil S. Siegel, Theorizing the Law/Politics Distinction: 
Neutral Principles, Affirmative Action, and the Enduring Legacy of Paul Mishkin, 95 CAL. 
L. REV. 1473, 1501 (2007). 
 28. For an insightful discussion of constitutional visions that focuses on the pathmarking 
politics of certain transformative presidents, see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 53-58 (2007). 
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overlap between basic visions may be a principal reason that a particular 
President seeks to put a particular individual on the Supreme Court of the 
United States.29 
Of course, this is not to suggest that Presidents and Justices may 
appropriately do the same things with a constitutional vision. Presidents 
and Justices occupy different institutional roles that serve distinct, if 
partially overlapping, sets of social functions.30 Moreover, they typically 
confront different kinds of issues, and even when they consider the same 
questions, they do so at different points in time while operating under 
different constraints.31 For example, a President need not concern him- or 
herself with securing the social “goods of consistency, stability, 
predictability, and transparency that are essential to the rule of law”32 to 
nearly the same extent as a Supreme Court Justice.33 Presidents and Justices 
who possess similar constitutional visions remain different actors in 
critically important ways. 
Accordingly, to suggest that both Presidents and Justices may possess 
constitutional visions is not to obliterate distinctions between judicial role 
and political role or to insist that the same considerations are relevant to the 
legitimation of each. But it is to suggest that “ragged and blurred 
boundaries”34 often separate the realm of constitutional law from the 
domain of constitutional politics. It seems right to affirm both that legal 
reasoning is characteristically distinguishable from the practice of electoral 
politics, and that legal reasoning can be partially defined by the logic of an 
integrating constitutional conception that I call a constitutional vision—a  
 
 
 29. Presidents often refer to a judicial nominee’s “judicial philosophy,” which might be 
thought to refer to an interpretive methodology. But I suspect that most often this term 
refers, at least implicitly, to a constitutional vision. 
 30. I have elsewhere discussed various purposes of the institution of law, some of which 
are more central to law and others of which are also regarded as core purposes of politics. 
Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 969-79 (2008). 
 31. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 26 (1962) (“Their insulation and the marvelous mystery of 
time give courts the capacity to appeal to men’s better natures, to call forth their aspirations, 
which may have been forgotten in the moment’s hue and cry.”). 
 32. Post & Siegel, supra note 27, at 1477. 
 33. For a discussion of rule-of-law values and the particular importance that our 
constitutional community places on their vindication by courts, see JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of 
Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 210-26 (1979); Siegel, supra note 30, at 965, 
970-71; Post & Siegel, supra note 27, at 1476-77; Neil S. Siegel, A Theory In Search of a 
Court, and Itself: Judicial Minimalism at the Supreme Court Bar, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1951, 
2015-16 (2005). 
 34. Post & Siegel, supra note 27, at 1474. For further discussions, see generally Siegel, 
supra note 19; Siegel, supra note 30. 
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logic that is shared by a certain register of political language and vision. 
Both Presidents and Justices may appropriately be constitutionalists in the 
cultural sense. 
Indeed, constitutional visions do not merely inform both politics and 
jurisprudence. Persuasive visions partially integrate the two domains. The 
vision of a President may end up having a profound long-term impact on 
constitutional law.35 And sometimes the principled judicial imagination 
synthesizes subject matters in a way that both maintains judicial legitimacy 
and proves instructive for a broader political effort to articulate a normative 
vision with the power to move people. 
To understand the integrative function that constitutional visions 
perform, it is useful to consider the problem that has preoccupied 
constitutional theory for much of the past century, the “counter-
majoritarian difficulty.”36 A constitutional vision provides a potentially 
persuasive response to the question of what business nine unelected (and 
highly opinionated) judges have telling popular majorities that they cannot 
govern in whatever way they want. The persuasiveness of this response 
does not derive simply from associating a particular normative vision with 
“the law” and then insisting upon the autonomy of “the law” from “mere” 
politics, portraying the Justices as duty-bound to “interpret” and “apply” 
the law.37 No doubt there are certain rhetorical advantages associated with  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 35. Cf. Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Processes of Constitutional Change: 
From Partisan Entrenchment to the National Surveillance State, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 489, 
490 (2006) [hereinafter Balkin & Levinson, Change]; Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, 
Understanding the Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045, 1067 (2001) [hereinafter 
Balkin & Levinson, Revolution]. 
 36. BICKEL, supra note 31, at 16 (“The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-
majoritarian force in our system.”). 
 37. Id. at 74 (“Judges and lawyers recurrently come to feel that they find law rather than 
make it. Many otherwise painful problems seem to solve themselves with ease when this 
feeling envelops people.”). Of course, this way of talking about constitutional law has been 
with us from the beginning. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 
866 (1824) (“Courts are the mere instruments of the law . . . .”). 
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autonomy rhetoric.38 But it contemplates a sharp distinction between 
constitutional politics and constitutional law when the two must share a 
dialectical relation if constitutional law is to retain its legitimacy.39 
Moreover, the rhetorical advantages of this approach are easily 
overstated. As I have written about Chief Justice Roberts’ use of the 
“umpire analogy” during his Supreme Court confirmation hearing,40 if 
Americans think they want judicial umpires, they also want umpires who 
call the game their way, at least on the issues they care about most.41 This 
is why engaged citizens worry about who in particular sits on the Supreme 
Court and why the future of the Court is often an issue in presidential 
elections. It is also why no Democratic President would have nominated 
John Roberts or Samuel Alito for a seat on the Court, and why no 
Republican President would have nominated Sonia Sotomayor. These 
observations might seem too obvious to be worth recording, yet autonomy 
rhetoric cannot make any sense of them. 
A better approach begins with the recognition that the constitutional 
law pronounced by courts is not self-legitimating—that in discharging their 
responsibilities, the Justices must attend to the conditions of the 
legitimation of the law that they craft. Elsewhere, I have identified this 
 
 38. See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Constitutional Adjudication: Of 
Politics and Neutral Principles, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 587, 601 (1963) (“The distinction 
between what the Court says to the public about what it is doing and what scholars say to 
one another about what it is doing must be held firmly in mind . . . . It would be fantastic 
indeed if the Supreme Court in the name of sound scholarship were to publicly disavow the 
myth upon which its power rests.”); Siegel, supra note 19. 
 39. See Post & Siegel, supra note 27; Siegel, supra note 30. For a discussion, see 
generally Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the Legal 
Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (2003). 
 40. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice 
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) 
(statement of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr.), available at http://www.gpoaccess. 
gov/congress/senate/judiciary/sh109-158/55-56.pdf. (“Judges are like umpires. Umpires 
don’t make the rules, they apply them. The role of an umpire and a judge is critical. They 
make sure everybody plays by the rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball 
game to see the umpire.”). During her Supreme Court confirmation hearing, Judge 
Sotomayor made similar statements. See, e.g., Sotomayor Pledges “Fidelity to the Law,” 
CNNPOLITICS.COM, available at http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/07/13/sotomayor 
.hearing/index.html?iref=hpmostpop (visited Nov. 23, 2009) (“In the past month, many 
senators have asked me about my judicial philosophy. It is simple: fidelity to the law. The 
task of a judge is not to make the law—it is to apply the law. And it is clear, I believe, that 
my record in two courts reflects my rigorous commitment to interpreting the Constitution 
according to its terms . . . .”). 
 41. See Siegel, supra note 19, at 731. Full disclosure: I served on the Judiciary 
Committee Staff of then-Senator Joseph Biden during the hearing. 
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component of judicial role as the virtue of judicial statesmanship.42 “The 
Court is a leader of opinion, not a mere register of it,” Alexander Bickel 
instructed, “but it must lead opinion, not merely impose its own; and—the 
short of it is—it labors under the obligation to succeed.”43 Constitutional 
visions ameliorate the countermajoritarian difficulty to the extent that the 
Justices who possess them succeed over the long haul in securing the 
assent—or, at least, the acceptance—of the very people whose conduct the 
Court purports to govern in the name of the Constitution.44 
It may not be necessary for the Court to persuade a majority of 
Americans of the correctness of its rulings. But it must at least succeed in 
persuading a good number of Americans to abide by its decisions. With 
apologies to Justice Jackson,45 the Court is not truly final: 
The southern leaders [who opposed Brown] understood and 
acted upon an essential truth, which we do not often have 
occasion to observe and which dawned on the southerners 
themselves somewhat late; hence the contrast between initial 
reactions and what followed. The Supreme Court’s law, the 
southern leaders realized, could not in our system prevail—not 
merely in the very long run, but within the decade—if it ran 
counter to deeply felt popular needs or convictions, or even if it 
was opposed by a determined and substantial minority and 
received with indifference by the rest of the country. This, in the 
end, is how and why judicial review is consistent with the theory 
and practice of political democracy. This is why the Supreme 
Court is a court of last resort presumptively only.46 
More regularly, the confirmation process ensures that the current Court is 
not final,47 as does the frequent practice of norm contestation through 
presidential rhetoric and constitutional litigation.48 Moreover, in rare but 
important circumstances, the threat or reality of constitutional amendment 
can give the Court pause. 
 
 
 
 42. See generally Siegel, supra note 30. 
 43. BICKEL, supra note 31, at 239. 
 44. See Siegel, supra note 30, at 983-85. See generally Siegel, supra note 19, at 718-19. 
 45. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result) 
(“We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are 
final.”). 
 46. BICKEL, supra note 31, at 258. 
 47. See Balkin & Levinson, Revolution, supra note 35, at 1067-69. 
 48. See Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Democratic Constitutionalism, in THE 
CONSTITUTION IN 2020, supra note 5, at 28-29. 
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The foregoing explanation of why constitutional visions matter is 
judge-centered, and appropriately so: the countermajoritarian difficulty is a 
problem with which judges must contend, and a persuasive constitutional 
vision may help them competently to execute their responsibilities in 
crafting constitutional law. But it is at least as important—indeed, 
ultimately more important—to examine the bridging function of 
constitutional visions from the perspective of constitutional politics, not 
constitutional law. That is, it is critical to explore the problem not only 
from the perspective of a Court whose authority must be legitimated, but 
also from the perspective of participants in constitutional politics who 
possess a vision and who wish to see it embodied in constitutional law. 
In her public interactions, Justice Ginsburg has herself emphasized 
this side of the dialectical interaction; she recognizes the primacy of 
engaged citizens, social movements, and legal advocates in determining the 
ultimate success of any constitutional vision. For example, in concluding a 
1997 lecture that she delivered at the Hofstra Law School summer program 
in Nice, France, she did not emphasize her own majority opinion in the 
VMI case, United States v. Virginia.49 Rather, she underscored the 
“[l]itigation pursued by lawyers in the public interest,” which “had helped 
to make it ever more possible for our daughters, as well as our sons, to 
aspire and achieve according to their individual talent and capacities.”50 
Similarly, during a 2004 question-and-answer session with students at 
the City University of New York (CUNY) School of Law, Justice Ginsburg 
was asked to name “one or two of the most important legal issues that . . . 
the United States Supreme Court faces today.”51 She sought “to amend the 
question slightly to say: ‘What are the most important issues the people of 
the United States are facing today?’”52 Stressing “the balance between 
liberty and security,” she insisted that “[i]f the people don’t care about 
preserving their liberty and are overwhelmed by security concerns, there is 
no court that can change that sad development.”53 She noted that courts  
 
 
 
 49. 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
 50. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Constitutional Adjudication in the United States as a Means 
of Advancing the Equal Stature of Men and Women Under the Law, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 
263, 271 (1997). As my able research assistant, Natalie Bedoya, pointed out to me, the title 
of this piece identifies constitutional litigation as the means and advancing equal citizenship 
stature as the end. Visions specify ends. See infra Part II (exploring Justice Ginsburg’s 
constitutional vision). 
 51. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks of Ruth Bader Ginsburg at CUNY School of Law 
(Mar. 11, 2004), in 7 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 221, 232 (2004). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
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“are reactive institutions. We don’t create the controversies that come to us, 
we respond to the problems that are emerging in the society the courts exist 
to serve.”54 
Later at the same event, she was asked whether the U.S. Supreme 
Court would invalidate the death penalty “in our lifetimes.”55 Rather than 
talking about the composition of the Court, she responded that “[o]n a 
question like that, you are as competent to judge as I am,” and she 
reiterated that “[i]f people don’t care, it won’t happen. If people do care, 
and there are many lawyers who do, I hope their ranks will grow, change 
will become possible.”56 Again, she elected to underscore not the Court’s 
power to enact or resist social change, but the ultimate authority of the 
American public. 
From the standpoint of constitutional politics, the primary purpose of 
a constitutional vision is not necessarily to maintain the law/politics 
distinction. Quite the contrary, the main purpose may be to unsettle it—to 
enable citizens through political mobilization eventually to impact the 
future path of constitutional law. Throughout American history, the impact 
of political mobilization on constitutional law has been ubiquitous and 
profound. Among many other things, this seems the most sensible way to 
account for the evolution of the Court’s racial equality jurisprudence,57 its 
sex discrimination jurisprudence,58 its abortion jurisprudence,59 and now, 
its Second Amendment jurisprudence. As Reva Siegel has shown,60 social 
movement struggle helps to explain the contours of the Court’s recent  
 
 
 
 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 236. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See generally Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and 
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470 
(2004). 
 58. See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and 
Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (2006) 
(“The ERA was not ratified, but the amendment’s proposal and defeat played a crucial role 
in enabling and shaping the modern law of sex discrimination. Yet constitutional law [as 
typically conceived] lacks tools to explain constitutional change of this kind.”). 
 59. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 30, at 1028-29 (discussing the doctrinal evolution from 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), to Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007)). 
 60. Professor Siegel offers an account of the social movement conflict that ultimately 
shaped Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Heller. Siegel, supra note 19, at 191, 192-93 
(showing how Heller respects claims and compromises forged in social movement conflict 
over the right to bear arms in the decades after Brown). 
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declaration—for the first time in American history—that the Constitution 
protects an individual right to possess a handgun in the home for purposes 
of self-defense.61 
It is precisely because constitutional law “is historically conditioned 
and politically shaped”62 that constitutional visions are potentially so 
consequential. Without a vision—not a series of discrete political positions 
on unrelated issues, but a vision—it may be impossible to persuade one’s 
fellow citizens to adopt one’s conception of American identity as their 
own. It takes a vision that ties particular constitutional understandings to 
the ideals and interests of large numbers of Americans consistently to elect 
Presidents who appoint judges who in turn embody that vision in 
constitutional law.63 It does not happen overnight. Slowly but surely, 
however, politics becomes law, as it did in Heller,64 or law returns to the 
realm of “mere” politics, as happened during the constitutional crisis of 
1937.65 Constitutional visions partially integrate constitutional politics and 
constitutional law. They are a powerful means through which citizens and 
the leaders they elect seek to shape the course of constitutional law. 
 
 61. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821-22 (2008) (holding that the 
Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess a firearm—including a 
handgun—unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that firearm for traditionally 
lawful purposes, such as self-defense within the home). 
 62. H. JEFFERSON POWELL, A COMMUNITY BUILT ON WORDS: THE CONSTITUTION IN 
HISTORY AND POLITICS 6 (2002). 
 63. It is no coincidence that our most influential Presidents, particularly Franklin 
Roosevelt and Abraham Lincoln, possessed coherent constitutional visions. See 
WHITTINGTON, supra note 28, at 53-54, 56-58. “The ‘New Deal’ was more than a slogan for 
a particular list of policies. The New Deal was the realization of Roosevelt’s constitutional 
vision, an effort to achieve ‘greater freedom [and] greater security for the average man.’” Id. 
at 57 (quoting Roosevelt, supra note 26). As for Lincoln, “the promissory note of the 
Declaration of Independence’s egalitarianism had to be repaid and the temporary 
compromise with slavery had to be abandoned.” WHITTINGTON, supra note 28, at 58 n.120. 
More recently, President Reagan articulated a conservative constitutional vision, much of 
which has been implemented over the past few decades. See infra note 66 and 
accompanying text. 
 64. See generally Siegel, supra note 19. 
 65. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: 
The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383, 1387 (2001) (“The proper lesson of 
Lochner instructs us that, even where it is possible to identify a jurisprudential basis for 
judicial decisions, if those familiar with the Court’s decisions do not believe those decisions 
to be socially correct, the work of judges will be seen as illegitimate. There will be attacks 
on judges and, ultimately, on the institution of judicial review. Even in the face of 
established precedent, law itself will come to be seen as nothing but politics.”) (referencing 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). 
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II. Justice Ginsburg’s Inclusive Vision 
It is well established that there currently exists a conservative 
constitutional vision on the U.S. Supreme Court.66 Rather than offering my 
own account of the content of this vision, I will show that there also is a 
coherent progressive vision, one that Justice Ginsburg has been expressing 
since her days as a legal advocate on behalf of women’s rights during the 
1970s. I will identify the vision that informs and integrates Justice 
Ginsburg’s responses to constitutional questions with identity-defining 
dimensions.67 
Those who (accurately) think of Justice Ginsburg as “a judge’s judge” 
or “a lawyer’s lawyer”68 may object that it is inappropriate to associate her 
with something so seemingly grand as a constitutional vision. After all, she 
can become obsessed—her clerks might suggest “possessed”—by the most 
 
 66. If originalism is understood not as a theory of constitutional interpretation but as a 
conservative political movement advancing themes of traditional family, public religion, 
racial retrenchment, state sovereignty, and social control, then Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito are well described as possessing much the same 
constitutional vision. See generally Post & Siegel, supra note 48; Jamal Greene, Selling 
Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657 (2009); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a 
Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545 (2006); Dawn 
E. Johnsen, Ronald Reagan and the Rehnquist Court on Congressional Power: Presidential 
Influences on Constitutional Change, 78 IND. L. REV. 363, 408 (2003) (“President Reagan’s 
efforts to transform constitutional meaning put him in a class with Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and a handful of other Presidents. Reagan developed and pursued a constitutional vision 
extraordinary in its breadth of issues, its detail of analysis, and its ambition for presidential 
power.”). Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito were chosen to 
advance this conservative vision, and each has done so. It is striking how much of the vision 
has been realized. 
 67. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (discussing the idea of identity-defining 
conflicts). I do not address here the extent to which Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer 
possess identifiable constitutional visions, nor do I explore the degree of overlap between 
their approaches and that of Justice Ginsburg. But judging from their voting patterns and the 
frequency with which they join (or cite) one another’s opinions, it seems likely that the 
degree of overlap is substantial and that there are some differences. Relative to Justice 
Ginsburg, for example, Justice Breyer puts more emphasis on themes of deference to 
democratic decision making. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: 
INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005). I leave Justice Sotomayor aside 
because she just joined the Court. 
 68. See, e.g., Joyce A. Baugh, Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A Judge’s Judge and a Lawyer’s 
Lawyer, in SUPREME COURT JUSTICES IN THE POST-BORK ERA: CONFIRMATION POLITICS AND 
JUDICIAL PERFORMANCE 61-80 (2002); Judith Baer, Advocate on the Court: Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg and the Limits of Formal Equality, in REHNQUIST JUSTICE: UNDERSTANDING THE 
COURT DYNAMIC 216, 216 (Earl M. Maltz ed., 2003) (quoting Peter Huber & Richard 
Taranto, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, A Judge’s Judge, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1993, at A18). 
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technical questions of civil procedure,69 and she is better known for her 
cautious and careful approach to controversial questions than for theoretical 
ascents.70 No doubt, she does not ascribe to a theory of constitutional 
interpretation. But she has long possessed a foundational understanding of 
the cultural ideals that our Constitution is charged with realizing over time. 
During her Supreme Court confirmation hearing, then-Judge 
Ginsburg put the Senate and the public on notice of the core content of her 
constitutional vision. Senator Orrin Hatch asked whether she agreed that 
“[t]he only legitimate way for a judge to go about defining the law is by 
attempting to discern what those who made the law intended.”71 While she 
thought everyone could agree with this statement, she also cautioned 
against relying on the “immediate” [intentions of the Framers] “for their 
day” [in light of] “their larger expectation that the Constitution would 
govern, as Cardozo said, not for the passing hour, but for the expanding 
future.”72 
To illustrate her point, she tellingly turned to the author of the 
Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson, who once opined that 
“‘[w]ere our state a pure democracy, there would still be excluded from our 
deliberations women who, to prevent depravation of morals and ambiguity 
of issues, should not mix promiscuously in gatherings of men.’”73 Noting 
that Jefferson’s “understanding of ‘all men are created equal’ . . . for his 
day, for his time” was that “‘the breasts of women were not made for 
political convulsion,’” she stated that she saw “an immediate intent about 
how an ideal is going to be recognized at a given time and place, but also a  
 
 
 69. For a characteristic, if little known, example of Justice Ginsburg’s mastery of 
procedural questions, see generally her opinion for a unanimous Court in Kontrick v. Ryan, 
540 U.S. 443 (2004). 
 70. See, e.g., Baer, supra note 68, at 221-22 (identifying John Marshall Harlan II as 
Justice Ginsburg’s judicial “hero” and arguing that she “has demonstrated a similar style of 
what might be called restrained activism or activist restraint”). Certain decisions of the 
Court’s recently reconstituted majority have caused Justice Ginsburg to move somewhat 
from being a cautious liberal to being, at times, an angry liberal. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 
550 U.S. 124, 169-71 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & 
Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 643 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg read from 
the bench her dissents in both cases. It is rare for her to read a dissent from the bench once a 
Term, let alone twice. See Linda Greenhouse, Oral Dissents Give Ginsburg a New Voice on 
Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007, at A1. For discussion of these cases, see infra notes 110-
126, 208-209 and accompanying text. 
 71. The Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg, to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 127 
(1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 72. Id. (statement of J. Ginsburg). 
 73. Id. 
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larger aspiration as our society improves. I think the Framers were 
intending to create a more perfect union that would become ever more 
perfect over time.”74 
Justice Ginsburg thus underscored for the Senators who would be 
voting on her confirmation that she could be characterized as an originalist 
in a certain, limited sense, but not in the mold of Justice Scalia or Justice 
Thomas.75 Rather than regarding a judge as constrained by the original 
understanding (or original expected application) of a constitutional 
provision, she expressed her belief that the meaning of the Constitution 
changes over time, as each generation of Americans seeks to perfect 
constitutional ideals that were originally articulated by the Founders.76 
They perfect these ideals in part by broadening the universe of 
beneficiaries—for example, by according women the respect and 
opportunities they are due as full-fledged members of the political 
community. 
In a similar vein, Justice Ginsburg has noted approvingly that Justice 
Thurgood Marshall “celebrated how our fundamental instrument of 
government had evolved over the span of two centuries,” not “what the 
Constitution was in the beginning.”77 Yet she has taken care to “appreciate, 
too, that the equal dignity of individuals is part of the constitutional legacy, 
shaped and bequeathed to us by the framers, in a most vital sense.”78 The 
founders, she explained, “rebelled against the patriarchal power of kings 
and the idea that political authority may legitimately rest on birth status.”79 
Although their culture prevented them from fully understanding, let alone 
realizing, the constitutional ideals that they espoused, “they stated a 
commitment in the Declaration of Independence to equality and in the  
 
 
 
 74. Id. 
 75. Cf. Henry Paul Monaghan, Doing Originalism, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 32, 35-36, 38 
(2004) (arguing that the originalism of Justice Ginsburg, unlike that of Justice Scalia, is 
concerned with “historically constrained evolution,” according to which “[s]he looks for the 
central purposes of the relevant constitutional provision and tries to apply it in a vastly 
different world”). 
 76. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 587 (2005) (Stevens, J., joined by 
Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“[T]hat our understanding of the Constitution does change from 
time to time has been settled since John Marshall breathed life into its text.”). 
 77. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Foreword to SUPREME COURT DECISIONS AND WOMEN’S 
RIGHTS: MILESTONES IN EQUALITY xii (Clare Cushman ed., CQ Press 2001) (discussing 
Thurgood Marshall, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (1987)) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Foreword]. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
816 NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:799 
Declaration and Bill of Rights to individual liberty. Those commitments 
had growth potential.”80 She has often invoked historian Richard Morris for 
the proposition that 
a prime portion of the history of the U.S. Constitution, and a 
cause for celebration, is the story of the extension (through 
amendment, judicial interpretation, and practice) of 
constitutional rights and protections to once ignored or excluded 
people: to humans who were once held in bondage, to men 
without property, to the original inhabitants of the land that 
became the United States, and to women.81 
Affording “equal dignity”82 to all Americans, including historically 
marginalized groups, constitutes the central purpose of Justice Ginsburg’s 
constitutional vision. As I now show, this theme is powerfully present in 
her responses to numerous constitutional questions, beginning (but not 
ending) with equal protection doctrine. 
A. Illustrations of Justice Ginsburg’s Vision 
1. Equal Protection—General 
Equal protection is the area of constitutional law that arguably has 
been of greatest concern to Justice Ginsburg in her roles as professor, 
advocate, and judge. In the aforementioned discussion with students at 
CUNY Law School, an audience member asked her what standard of 
review she would apply in equal protection cases in an ideal world. She 
rejected the notion that the Court mechanically relies on tiers of scrutiny, 
stating that “[t]he labels are often rationalizations for results reached on 
other grounds.”83 She thought, however, that there was an underlying 
principle. She called it “the idea of essential human dignity, that we are all 
 
 80. Id. For a discussion of the import of Justice Ginsburg’s reference in the text to 
individual liberty, see infra notes 218-221 and accompanying text. 
 81. Ginsburg, Foreword, supra note 77, at xii (quoting RICHARD B. MORRIS, THE 
FORGING OF THE UNION, 1781-1789, at 193 (1987)); see Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a 
Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1186-88 (1992) [hereinafter Speaking in a Judicial 
Voice] (recording similar views); Ginsburg, supra note 50, at 265-66 (same); see also infra 
note 95 (noting Justice Ginsburg’s invocation of Morris in United States v. Virginia, 518 
U.S. 515, 557 (1996)). 
 82. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. 
 83. Ginsburg, supra note 51, at 238; accord Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones 
Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 
253, 269 (1999) (“I continue to view with suspicion endeavors to bundle the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s equal protection decisions into neat packages under the headings ‘strict scrutiny,’ 
‘intermediate’ inspection, relaxed or ‘rational relationship’ review.”). 
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people entitled to respect from our Government as persons of full human 
stature, and must not be treated as lesser creatures.”84 “The notion of 
essential human dignity,” she insisted, “is the driving force behind what we 
place under the heading of equal protection.”85 Time and again, her 
opinions reflect her embrace of this “underlying principle.” 
2. Equal Protection—Gender 
In her role as founder and general counsel of the ACLU Women’s 
Rights Project during the 1970s, Professor Ginsburg developed an effective 
litigation strategy to combat sex discrimination. She sought to expose the 
role of law in subordinating women by enforcing sex-role stereotypes of 
the separate-spheres tradition, according to which men were expected to 
perform as breadwinners and women were expected to perform as 
economically dependent caregivers.86 But her legal advocacy on behalf of 
women’s rights arguably did not find its fullest expression in the law until 
the 1990s, when she was elevated to the Supreme Court. 
In perhaps her most important majority opinion, Justice Ginsburg 
rejected the Virginia Military Institute’s exclusion of women on the ground 
that the Commonwealth of Virginia was constitutionally disabled from 
regarding them as second-class citizens. “Through a century plus three 
decades and more of [American] history,” she wrote for the Court, “women 
did not count among voters composing ‘We the People.’”87 She noted that 
 
 84. Ginsburg, supra note 51, at 238. 
 85. Id. at 239. 
 86. See generally, e.g., AMY LEIGH CAMPBELL, RAISING THE BAR: RUTH BADER 
GINSBURG AND THE ACLU WOMEN’S RIGHTS PROJECT (2003); Cary Franklin, The Anti-
Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
(forthcoming April 2010); Serena Mayeri, Reconstructing the Race-Sex Analogy, 49 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1789 (2008). For Professor Ginsburg’s academic treatments of the subject at 
the time, see generally, for example, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1975); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Benign Classification in 
the Context of Sex, 10 CONN. L. REV. 813 (1978). 
 87. United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (“Today’s skeptical 
scrutiny of official action denying rights or opportunities based on sex responds to volumes 
of history.”). For an insightful analysis of Justice Ginsburg’s use of discredited history as 
“negative precedent” in VMI, see generally Deborah A. Widiss, Note, Re-viewing History: 
The Use of the Past as Negative Precedent in United States v. Virginia, 108 YALE L.J. 237 
(1998). 
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since Reed v. Reed,88 “the Court has repeatedly recognized that neither 
federal nor state government acts compatibly with the equal protection 
principle when a law or official policy denies to women, simply because 
they are women, full citizenship stature—equal opportunity to aspire, 
achieve, participate in and contribute to society based on their individual 
talents and capacities.”89 While Virginia’s plan to afford a unique 
educational benefit only to males “serves the Commonwealth’s sons,” she 
wrote, “it makes no provision whatever for her daughters. That is not equal 
protection.”90 In the view now of seven Justices, including Chief Justice 
Rehnquist,91 VMI’s mission to produce “citizen soldiers” certainly “is great 
 
 88. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). Ginsburg played a pivotal role in litigating Reed. See LINDA 
GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S SUPREME COURT 
JOURNEY 209 (2005). As Ms. Greenhouse noted: 
In one of the earliest cases, Reed v. Reed, the Court was asked to 
invalidate an Idaho law that gave automatic preference to men over 
women in being selected as administrators of estates. Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, then a law professor and an attorney for the American Civil 
Liberties Union’s Women’s Rights Project, worked on the brief for the 
appellant, Sally Reed, although she did not argue the case. 
Id.; see also Rebecca L. Barnhart & Deborah Zalesne, Twin Pillars of Judicial Philosophy: 
The Impact of the Ginsburg Collegiality and Gender Discrimination Principles on Her 
Separate Opinions Involving Gender Discrimination, 7 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 275, 280 (2004) 
(“Although the Court did not apply a higher level of scrutiny to sex-based classifications, 
Ginsburg had planted the seed, and the Reed brief would become known as the 
‘Grandmother Brief’ because it contained the legal arguments for all subsequent gender 
discrimination cases.”). 
 89. VMI, 518 U.S. at 532. 
 90. Id. at 540. 
 91. For further evidence of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s movement over the decades in the 
area of sex discrimination, see Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 736-40 
(2003) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (upholding the family-care leave provision of the Family and 
Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA) as a valid exercise of Congress’ power under Section 
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to combat unconstitutional sex discrimination). 
Commentators have noted the magnitude of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s shift in position from 
his early days on the Court to VMI and then Hibbs. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Learning to 
Listen to Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 7 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 213, 218-19 (2004); Deborah Jones 
Merritt & David M. Lieberman, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Jurisprudence of Opportunity and 
Equality, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 39, 47 (2004); Reva B. Siegel, You’ve Come A Long Way, 
Baby: Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
1871-98 (2006). The evolution of the late Chief Justice’s views on sex discrimination is as 
striking as the development of his relationship with Justice Ginsburg is endearing. During 
my year in her chambers, I witnessed the respect and devotion with which she referred to 
him as “the Chief” or “my Chief.” See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 50, at 267-68 (discussing, 
inter alia, the change in Chief Justice Rehnquist’s views on sex discrimination and referring 
to him as “my now Chief”). 
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enough to accommodate women, who today count as citizens in our 
American democracy equal in stature to men.”92 
Turning from the question of liability to the issue of remedy, Justice 
Ginsburg deemed constitutionally inadequate Virginia’s offer of a separate 
and unequal substitute that brought to mind the new Texas law school 
deemed insufficient in Sweatt v. Painter.93 The very comparison to Sweatt 
underscored her view of the dominant social meaning of VMI’s exclusion 
of women. While previous generations of Americans were untroubled by 
VMI’s admissions policy,94 this fact was not decisive. Invoking historian 
Richard Morris,95 she wrote that “VMI’s story continued as our 
comprehension of ‘We the People’ expanded.”96 She perceived “no reason 
to believe that the admission of women capable of all the activities required 
of VMI cadets would destroy the Institute rather than enhance its capacity 
to serve the ‘more perfect Union.’”97 In her judgment, and in the judgment 
of the Court she helped to persuade, the Union becomes more perfect as 
our Constitution’s comprehension of “We the People” broadens to include 
women. 
Notably, Justice Ginsburg seemed to problematize the Court’s use of 
tiers of scrutiny in equal protection cases: she required “an exceedingly 
persuasive justification”98 for government action on the basis of gender, a 
standard that seemed closer to strict scrutiny than to intermediate 
 
 92. VMI, 518 U.S. at 545. 
 93. Id. at 553, 557 (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633-34 (1950)) (comparing 
Virginia’s proposed solution to the remedy proposed by Texas in Sweatt). 
 94. See id. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Much of the Court’s opinion is devoted to 
deprecating the closed-mindedness of our forebears with regard to women’s education, and 
even with regard to the treatment of women in areas that have nothing to do with 
education.”). 
 95. See supra text accompanying note 81 (quoting Ginsburg’s invocation of Morris). 
 96. VMI, 518 U.S. at 557 (footnote and citations omitted) (referencing MORRIS, supra 
note 81, at 193). 
 97. Id. at 558. 
 98. Id. at 531. See id. at 571 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting “[t]he Court’s nine 
invocations of that phrase”). 
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scrutiny.99 Yet she was careful to maintain the law’s distinction between 
practices of exclusion and inclusion. “‘Inherent differences’ between men 
and women, we have come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but 
not for denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial constraints 
on an individual’s opportunity.”100 Justice Ginsburg explained that “[s]ex 
classifications may be used to compensate women ‘for particular economic 
disabilities [they have] suffered,’101 to ‘promot[e] equal employment 
opportunity,’102 to advance full development of the talent and capacities of 
our Nation’s people.’”103 But, she underscored, “such classifications may 
not be used, as they once were, to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and 
economic inferiority of women.”104 As legal historian Serena Mayeri has 
written, “[p]romoting women’s advancement and equal participation in the 
society, the polity, and the economy was, Ginsburg essentially declared, an 
‘exceedingly persuasive justification.’”105 
3. Abortion 
The ideal of equal citizenship stature animates Justice Ginsburg’s 
approach to the permissibility of government regulation of abortion. In her 
controversial critique of Roe v. Wade,106 she wrote that “the shape of the 
law on gender-based classification and reproductive autonomy indicates 
and influences the opportunity women will have to participate as men’s full 
 
 99. This language originated in earlier cases. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 
511 U.S. 127, 136-37 & n.6 (1994); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 
(1982); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979). In VMI, however, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist insisted that these decisions used the language to describe the difficulty of 
meeting the standard of review, not the standard of review itself. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 559 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in judgment). Justice Scalia was substantially more harsh in his 
criticism. See, e.g., id. at 573 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Only the amorphous ‘exceedingly 
persuasive justification’ phrase, and not the standard elaboration of intermediate scrutiny, 
can be made to yield this conclusion that VMI’s single-sex composition is unconstitutional 
because there exist several women . . . willing and able to undertake VMI’s program.”). 
 100. VMI, 518 U.S. at 533. 
 101. Id. (quoting Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 320 (1977) (per curiam)). 
 102. Id. (quoting Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 289 (1987)). 
 103. Id. at 533-34. 
 104. Id. at 534 (citing Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 467 (1948)). 
 105. Mayeri, supra note 86, at 1851. For a recent, forceful explication of Justice 
Ginsburg’s views on sex discrimination, see AT&T Corporation v. Hulteen, 129 S.Ct. 1962, 
1978-80 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 106. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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partners in the nation’s social, political, and economic life.”107 Similarly, 
she insisted that “[a]lso in the balance is a woman’s autonomous charge of 
her full life’s course . . . her ability to stand in relation to man, society, and 
the state as an independent, self-sustaining, equal citizen.”108 Her analysis 
of the abortion question thus focused primarily not on the right to privacy, 
but on the “woman’s equality aspect” to reproductive rights, the “equal-
regard values involved in cases on abortion.”109 
Justice Ginsburg reaffirmed her approach to restrictive abortion 
regulations more than two decades later, in her dissent in Gonzales v. 
Carhart.110 The five-Justice majority rejected a facial challenge to the 
federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, even though the statute 
lacked the health exception that the Court in Stenberg v. Carhart111 had 
held was required under Planned Parenthood v. Casey.112 Dissenting, 
Justice Ginsburg wrote that “legal challenges to undue restrictions on 
abortion procedures do not seek to vindicate some generalized notion of 
privacy; rather, they center on a woman’s autonomy to determine her life’s 
course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship stature.”113 
Justice Ginsburg wrote with uncharacteristic anger. She insisted that 
the Court’s treatment of the medical evidence was “in undisguised conflict 
with Stenberg,”114 and that the statute did not advance the government’s 
interest in protecting fetal life because “[t]he law saves not a single fetus 
from destruction, for it targets only a method of performing abortion.”115 
She further insisted that it is “‘simply irrational’” to regard the banned 
procedure as warranting state intervention to a greater extent than the most  
 
 
 107. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe 
v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 375 (1985) [hereinafter Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on 
Autonomy and Equality]. See Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, supra note 81, at 
1198-209 (further critiquing Roe). 
 108. Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality, supra note 107, at 383. 
 109. Id. at 385. 
 110. 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). See Cass R. Sunstein, Editorial, Ginsburg’s Dissent May Yet 
Prevail, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2007, at A31 (noting that in Gonzales v. Carhart, Justice 
Ginsburg “attempted to reconceive the foundations of the abortion right, basing it on well-
established constitutional principles of equality”). 
 111. 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 112. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 113. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Reva Siegel, 
Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions 
of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261 (1992); Sylvia Law, Rethinking Sex and the 
Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1002-28 (1984)). 
 114. Id. at 1646. 
 115. Id. at 1647. 
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common method of second-trimester, previability abortion, and that the 
Court “dishonors our precedent” by allowing “moral concerns” to 
“overrid[e] fundamental rights.”116 
Justice Ginsburg seemed most provoked by the Court’s invocation of 
“an antiabortion shibboleth for which it concededly has no reliable 
evidence: Women who have abortions come to regret their choices.”117 She 
skewered the Court’s fear that doctors might withhold information about 
the nature of the banned procedure “[b]ecause of women’s fragile 
emotional state and because of the ‘bond of love the mother has for her 
child.’”118 She noted incredulously that “[t]he solution the Court approves, 
then, is not to require doctors to inform women, accurately and adequately, 
of the different procedures and their attendant risks,”119 but to “depriv[e] 
women of the right to make an autonomous choice, even at the expense of 
their safety.”120 The Court’s “way of thinking,” she charged while 
explicitly invoking the Court’s equal protection precedents, “reflects 
ancient notions about women’s place in the family and under the 
Constitution—ideas that have long since been discredited.”121 In effect, 
Justice Ginsburg concluded that banning an abortion procedure for the 
gender-paternalistic reasons offered by the majority violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.122 
Justice Ginsburg would have invalidated the statute on its face 
because “the absence of a health exception burdens all women for whom it 
is relevant—women who, in the judgment of their doctors, require [the 
banned procedure] because other procedures would place their health at 
risk.”123 Concluding with extraordinary bluntness, she wrote that “the 
Court, differently composed than it was when we last considered a 
restrictive abortion regulation, is hardly faithful to our earlier invocations 
 
 116. Id. (citations omitted). 
 117. Id. at 1648. 
 118. Id. at 1634 (majority opinion). 
 119. Gonzales, 127 S.Ct. at 1648-49 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 120. Id. at 1649. 
 121. Id. Justice Ginsburg compared Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422-23 (1908) and 
Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring), with United 
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 542, n.12 (1996), and Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 
199, 207 (1977). Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 122. For development of this argument, see Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of 
Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 991 (2007). 
 123. Gonzales, 127 S. Ct. at 1651 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg also 
asserted that the Court “offers no clue” regarding what an appropriate as-applied challenge 
“might look like.” Id. 
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of ‘the rule of law’ and the ‘principles of stare decisis.’”124 She thought 
“the Act, and the Court’s defense of it, cannot be understood as anything 
other than an effort to chip away at a right declared again and again by this 
Court—and with increasing comprehension of its centrality to women’s 
lives.”125 
In Gonzales v. Carhart, Justice Ginsburg viewed the statute under 
review as threatening the equal citizenship of American women. Indeed, 
she explicitly invoked the impediments to “‘women’s progress toward full 
citizenship stature throughout our Nation’s history” that she underscored on 
behalf of the Court in United States v. Virginia.126 And from her 
perspective, what enabled this significant change in the constitutional law 
of abortion likely added insult to injury: Justice Alito’s replacement of 
Justice O’Connor left her, at that time, as the lone remaining woman on the 
Court. 
4. Equal Protection—Race 
As suggested by her invocation of Sweatt in VMI, Justice Ginsburg’s 
commitment to equal citizenship stature orients her equal protection 
jurisprudence in the area of racial equality. Indeed, in race cases she has 
urged the same distinction between keeping a door closed and opening it 
that she has drawn in gender cases. She also has viewed mechanical 
application of the tiers of scrutiny as impeding realization of the 
Constitution’s equality command. 
Justice Ginsburg has insisted that the Constitution properly accounts 
for the difference between the logic of racial subordination and the logic of 
race-conscious remedy. In implementing the “equality instruction” of the 
Equal Protection Clause, she urged in her dissent in Gratz v. Bollinger,127 
“government decisionmakers may properly distinguish between policies of 
exclusion and inclusion.”128 She asserted that “[a]ctions designed to burden 
groups long denied full citizenship stature are not sensibly ranked with 
measures taken to hasten the day when entrenched discrimination and its 
aftereffects have been extirpated.”129 
In line with this substantive understanding of equality, Justice 
Ginsburg reminded the Nation in Gratz that “we are not far distant from an 
overtly discriminatory past, and the effects of centuries of law-sanctioned 
 
 124. Id. at 1652. 
 125. Id. at 1653. 
 126. Id. at 1649 (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 542 n.12 (1996)). 
 127. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
 128. Id. at 301 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 129. Id. 
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inequality remain painfully evident in our communities and schools.”130 
She further noted that “[t]he racial and ethnic groups to which the College 
accords special consideration (African-Americans, Hispanics, and Native-
Americans) historically have been relegated to inferior status by law and 
social practice,” and “their members continue to experience class-based 
discrimination to this day.”131 Similarly, she observed in her concurring 
opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger132 that “it was only 25 years before Bakke 
that this Court declared public school segregation unconstitutional, a 
declaration that, after prolonged resistance, yielded an end to a law-
enforced racial caste system, itself the legacy of centuries of slavery.”133 
In Justice Ginsburg’s view, the institution of affirmative action in 
higher education seeks to redress past (and present) racial discrimination 
and its manifold social consequences, thereby promoting equal citizenship 
stature.134 She views similarly the practice of affirmative action in other 
settings, as she suggested in her dissenting opinion in Adarand 
Constructors, Inc. v. Peña.135 And she places in the same category the post-
Brown project of racially integrating America’s public schools, whether 
 
 130. Id. at 298. 
 131. Id. at 303. 
 132. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
 133. Id. at 345 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265 (1978)). 
 134. Remedial logic also pervades the reasoning of Justices who expressly speak the 
language of “diversity” in affirmative action cases. See, e.g., Post, supra note 39, at 63, 74; 
Neil S. Siegel, Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans: Balkanization, Integration, and 
Individualized Consideration, 56 DUKE L.J. 781, 790-800 (2006). 
 135. 515 U.S. 200 (1995). Justice Ginsburg wrote in this government contracting case: 
Those effects [of past racial discrimination], reflective of a system of 
racial caste only recently ended, are evident in our workplaces, markets, 
and neighborhoods. Job applicants with identical resumes, 
qualifications, and interview styles still experience different receptions, 
depending on their race. White and African American consumers still 
encounter different deals.  People of color looking for housing still face 
discriminatory treatment by landlords, real estate agents, and mortgage 
lenders.  Minority entrepreneurs sometimes fail to gain contracts though 
they are the low bidders, and they are sometimes refused work even 
after winning contracts.  Bias both conscious and unconscious, 
reflecting traditional and unexamined habits of thought, keeps up 
barriers that must come down if equal opportunity and 
nondiscrimination are ever genuinely to become this country’s law and 
practice. 
Id. at 273-74 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (footnotes and citations omitted). 
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through court order or through voluntary efforts by local communities.136 
For her, efforts to secure equal citizenship stature implicate precisely the 
opposite purposes, effects, and social meanings of the brutal practices of 
racial subordination that prevailed throughout most of American history.137 
Accordingly, Justice Ginsburg’s approach to race cases, like her 
approach in VMI, may be understood as a measured effort to destabilize the 
doctrinal constraints imposed by the tiers of scrutiny. While in VMI she 
endeavored to ramp up the level of scrutiny because she confronted a 
classification that she deemed invidious,138 in race cases she has tended to 
dial down the degree of judicial skepticism because she has tended to 
confront classifications that she deems benign.139 In Grutter, she went out 
of her way to record that the case presented no occasion “to revisit whether 
all governmental classifications by race, whether designed to benefit or to 
burden a historically disadvantaged group, should be subject to the same 
standard of judicial review.”140 In Gratz, she insisted that race is not 
“inevitably an impermissible classification.”141 
So too in Adarand. In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg read the lead 
opinion as requiring a “fatal” brand of strict scrutiny “for classifications 
burdening groups that have suffered discrimination in our society,” but as 
 
 136. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2836 
(2007) (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, & Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“For Brown held 
out a promise. It was a promise embodied in three Amendments designed to make citizens 
of slaves. It was the promise of true racial equality—not as a matter of fine words on paper, 
but as a matter of everyday life in the Nation’s cities and schools.”). 
 137. For a classic focus on the purposes, effects, and social meanings of a practice as 
determinative under equal protection analysis, see Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of 
the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 426 (1960) (“Can a system which, in all that 
can be measured, has practiced the grossest inequality, actually have been ‘equal’ in intent, 
in total social meaning and impact? ‘Thy speech maketh thee manifest . . .’; segregation, in 
all visible things, speaks only haltingly any dialect but that of inequality.”). 
 138. In VMI, Justice Ginsburg seemed to regard elevation of the level of scrutiny applied 
to sex classifications that enforce traditional sex-role stereotypes as the doctrinal expression 
of women’s own elevation in American society. See 518 U.S. at 531. What is more, she 
intimated more than once that the elevation of both was not yet complete. See id. at 532 & 
n.6 (summarizing “the Court’s current directions for cases of official classification based on 
gender,” and noting that “[t]he Court has thus far reserved most stringent judicial scrutiny 
for classifications based on race or national origin . . . .” (emphases added)). 
 139. But see Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 516 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) 
(reaffirming her “conviction that the same standard of review ought not control judicial 
inspection of every official race classification,” but agreeing that a state policy of racial 
segregation in prisons “warrants rigorous scrutiny”). 
 140. 539 U.S. at 346 n.* (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
 141. 539 U.S. at 301 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Nowalk Core v. Norwalk 
Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 931-32 (2d Cir. 1968)). 
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rejecting the notion that strict scrutiny is “‘fatal in fact’” for “a 
classification made to hasten the day when ‘we are just one race.’”142 
Significantly, she referenced the “Court’s once-lax review of sex-based 
classifications” as justifying “searching” review even of the ostensibly 
virtuous variety of racial classifications, “in order to ferret out 
classifications in reality malign, but masquerading as benign.”143 The link 
between her past work as a champion of women’s rights and her present 
work as a guarantor of racial equality was express in the United States 
Reports.144 
5. Equal Protection—Disability 
Justice Ginsburg is guided by equal-citizenship concerns in 
considering questions of equal protection for disabled Americans. In this 
context, too, she focuses on ending historic practices of exclusion and 
taking relevant differences into account. Here as well, her work as a 
women’s rights advocate has had a profound influence on the approach she 
has taken.145 
Indeed, disability issues were not new to Justice Ginsburg when she 
encountered them as a judge: much of her early work as a legal advocate 
was concerned with pregnancy, which can interfere with the performance 
of certain job functions. From the beginning, and particularly in her 
undernoticed merits brief in Struck v. Secretary of Defense,146 Justice 
Ginsburg has viewed discrimination against pregnant women as a core case 
 
 142. 515 U.S. at 275 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 143. Id. 
 144. See Mayeri, supra note 86, at 1850-53. 
 145. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Justice Ginsburg and the Judicial Role in Expanding “We 
the People”: The Disability Rights Cases, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 49, 56 (2004) (“[T]he 
critique of paternalism that lies at the core of disability rights thinking has much in common 
with—and was surely influenced by—the women’s movement’s own attack on paternalistic 
practices that limited women’s opportunities, an attack exemplified by then-Professor 
Ginsburg’s litigation agenda throughout the 1970s.”). 
 146. See Brief for Petitioner at 7, Struck v. Sec’y of Def., 409 U.S. 1071 (1972) (No. 72-
178). This brief has been underappreciated in part because the Court declined to hear the 
merits of the case. It also has been “neglected,” Reva B. Siegel, Comments, in WHAT ROE V. 
WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S MOST 
CONTROVERSIAL DECISION 245 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005), because the Court subsequently 
rejected an equal protection challenge to a pregnancy discrimination claim. Geduldig v. 
Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (upholding a California law that provided workers with 
comprehensive disability insurance for all temporarily disabling conditions that might 
prevent them from working, except pregnancy). For an attempt to recover the Struck brief, 
see generally Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Struck by Stereotype: Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
on Pregnancy Discrimination As Sex Discrimination, 59 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming January 
2010). 
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of sex discrimination.147 In Struck, she represented an Air Force officer, 
Captain Susan Struck, whose pregnancy—and whose refusal on religious 
grounds to have an abortion—subjected her to automatic discharge from 
military service. In her brief, Professor Ginsburg insisted that a key barrier 
to women’s full participation in American society was not pregnancy, but 
our society’s historic response to it: “Discharge for pregnancy, attended by 
termination of income and fringe benefits, and denial of the right to return 
after childbirth, disables these women far more than their temporary 
physical condition.”148 This argument, and her submission in Struck that the 
status quo is not neutral—that certain “practices operate as ‘built-in 
headwinds’ that drastically curtail women’s opportunities”149—foreshadow 
fundamental arguments of the contemporary disability rights movement. 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court in Olmstead v. L.C.,150 which 
held that unnecessary institutionalization of people with disabilities often 
constitutes “discrimination” prohibited by Title II of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990,151 has been called the “Brown v. Board of 
Education of the disability rights movement” by disability rights 
activists.152 According to Sam Bagenstos, a former Ginsburg clerk, “the 
Justice’s contributions to the legal acceptance of the disability rights 
movement promise to aid significantly in the achievement of equal 
citizenship for people with disabilities in this country.”153 Professor 
Bagenstos stresses Justice Ginsburg’s endorsement of the view of disability 
rights activists that “disability was neither a personal tragedy nor a source 
of inspiration for the nondisabled; disability was a minority-group status 
imposed by a society that was not accessible to individuals with physical or 
mental impairments that deviated too far from ‘the norm.’”154 From this 
perspective, a sidewalk without curb cuts is not neutral, nor is a courthouse 
 
 147. Recounting “Capt. Susan Struck’s story” during her Supreme Court confirmation 
hearing, then-Judge Ginsburg sought “to explain how my own thinking developed on this 
issue [of sex discrimination, and it came out of] a case involving a woman’s choice for birth 
rather than the termination of her pregnancy.” Hearings Before the Committee on the 
Judiciary: The Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to be Associate Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, 103d Cong. 205 (1993). She identified “the Struck brief” as 
“mark[ing] the time when I first thought long and hard about this question.” Id. at 206. 
 148. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 146, at 37. 
 149. Id. at 35 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (footnote 
omitted)). 
 150. 527 U.S. 581 (1999). 
 151. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
12213 (2000)); see also Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 587. 
 152. Bagenstos, supra note 145, at 49. 
 153. Id. at 50. 
 154. Id. at 51. 
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without an elevator. Moreover, people who use wheelchairs are not 
inherently disabled; rather, they are rendered disabled by their inaccessible 
environment. 
During the October 2003 Term, Justice Ginsburg reaffirmed her 
commitment to viewing disability in this way. Concurring in the Court’s 
decision to uphold congressional power to enact part of Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, she wrote in Tennessee v. Lane that the ADA “is a 
measure expected to advance equal-citizenship stature for persons with 
disabilities.”155 According to Ginsburg, “Congress understood in shaping 
the ADA” that “[i]ncluding individuals with disabilities among people who 
count in composing ‘We the People’ . . . would sometimes require not 
blindfolded equality, but responsiveness to difference; not indifference, but 
accommodation.”156 The Lane Court, she concluded, was “faithful to the 
Act’s demand for reasonable accommodation to secure access and avoid 
exclusion.”157 
6. Federalism 
Justice Ginsburg’s approach to federalism cases is informed by her 
inclusive constitutional vision. Specifically, she defends broad government 
power to secure equal citizenship for once-excluded or otherwise 
vulnerable Americans.158 In United States v. Morrison,159 for example, she 
had little difficulty concluding that Congress possessed ample authority 
under the Commerce Clause to enact part of the Violence Against Women 
Act of 1994 (VAWA),160 which provided a federal civil remedy for the 
victims of gender-motivated violence.161 
Similarly, her Lane concurrence addressed some of the federalism 
concerns underlying the Rehnquist Court’s Section 5 jurisprudence. She 
wrote that “[l]egislation calling upon all government actors to respect the 
 
 155. 541 U.S. 509, 536 (2004) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing Samuel R. Bagenstos, 
Surbordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 471 (2000)). 
 156. Id. at 536. 
 157. Id. at 537. 
 158. I shall not canvass Justice Ginsburg’s views on federalism in every significant area 
of constitutional law. A comprehensive survey would include discussion of her approaches 
to the Commerce Clause, the Tenth Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment, the enforcement 
clauses of the Civil War Amendments, preemption, and the dormant Commerce Clause. 
 159. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 160. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). 
 161. Justice Ginsburg joined Justice Souter’s dissent in full and Justice Breyer’s dissent 
in part. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 628 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 655 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
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dignity of individuals with disabilities is entirely compatible with our 
Constitution’s commitment to federalism, properly conceived.”162 This was 
so, she explained, because it is “not conducive to a harmonious federal 
system to require Congress, before it exercises authority under [Section] 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, essentially to indict each State for 
disregarding the equal-citizenship stature of persons with disabilities.”163 
Noting that “[m]embers of Congress are understandably reluctant to 
condemn their own States as constitutional violators, complicit in 
maintaining the isolated and unequal status of persons with disabilities[,]” 
she thought it inappropriate to “disarm a National Legislature for resisting 
an adversarial approach to lawmaking better suited to the courtroom.”164 
She deemed the record of exclusion before Congress “sufficed to warrant 
the barrier-lowering, dignity-respecting national solution the People’s 
representatives in Congress elected to order.”165 
By contrast, Justice Ginsburg invoked federalism concerns of her own 
in her dissent in Bush v. Gore,166 insisting in an extraordinary case upon the 
“ordinary principle” that federal courts defer to a state high court’s 
interpretation of state law.167 She rejected Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
implicit comparison of the Florida Supreme Court’s conduct to the massive 
resistance of state supreme courts during the Civil Rights Movement. 
Whereas those courts sought to undermine the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
insistence in Brown v. Board of Education upon the equal citizenship 
stature of African Americans,168 “the Florida Supreme Court “concluded 
that counting every legal vote was the overriding concern of the Florida 
legislature when it enacted the State’s Election Code. The court surely 
should not be bracketed with state high courts of the Jim Crow South.”169 
These few cases hardly capture most, let alone all, of Justice 
Ginsburg’s relevant views on constitutional federalism.170 But they do 
suggest that her constitutional vision influences her approach to cases with  
 
 
 162. Lane, 541 U.S. at 537. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. at 537-38. 
 165. Id. at 538. 
 166. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 167. Id. at 142 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 168. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 169. Bush, 531 U.S. at 141. 
 170. For example, Justice Ginsburg is among the Justices least likely to conclude that 
federal law preempts state law. See, e.g,. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999 (2008) 
(holding 8-1 that the Medical Device Act’s preemption clause bars common-law claims 
challenging the safety or effectiveness of a medical device marketed in a form that received 
pre-market approval from the FDA). Justice Ginsburg was the sole dissenter. 
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federalism components. Her assessment of federalism-based objections to 
government action appears to be informed by the extent to which such 
action advances or impedes equal-citizenship concerns. 
7. Additional Instances 
The ideal of equal citizenship stature animates Justice Ginsburg’s 
approach to central areas of constitutional law. This commitment accounts 
for the general views on constitutional change that she expressed during her 
confirmation hearing; her addendum to Justice Marshall’s stated view of 
the original Constitution; her basic approach to the Equal Protection Clause 
that she noted in her conversation with students at CUNY Law School; her 
views on gender discrimination that culminated in her majority opinion in 
VMI; her resistance to burdensome regulations of abortion, which she 
viewed as a form of gender discrimination in criticizing the Court in Roe 
and Gonzales v. Carhart; her substantive understanding of the 
Constitution’s commitment to racial equality in cases such as Grutter, 
Gratz, and Adarand; her conception of constitutional equality for disabled 
Americans in cases such as Olmstead and Lane; and the views on 
federalism that she expressed in the dissent she joined in Morrison, her 
concurring opinion in Lane, and her dissent in Bush v. Gore. 
These examples are illustrative, not exhaustive. I will suggest a few 
additional illustrations without developing them. Justice Ginsburg 
understands discrimination against homosexuals to implicate basic 
questions of equal citizenship stature.171 Likewise, her defense of a strict 
wall of separation between church and state seems animated by equal-
citizenship concerns. She has concluded that “the aim of the Establishment 
Clause is genuinely to uncouple government from church . . . .”172 
According to this view of the Clause, a robustly separationist approach— 
 
 
 
 
 
 171. Justice Ginsburg was in the majority in both Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and she dissented in Boy Scouts of 
America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). The majority opinion in Lawrence defended the 
dignity of intimate homosexual relationships and underscored the state’s lack of authority to 
demean homosexuals. See 539 U.S. at 567, 575, 578; see also infra note 218 and 
accompanying text (quoting some of the language from Lawrence and noting Justice 
Ginsburg’s subsequent invocation of this language). 
 172. Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 817-18 (1995) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)). 
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one that maintains a secular public space173—disables government from 
threatening the equal social status of citizens who may not support the 
religious practices advanced, endorsed, or coerced by government.174 
The ideal of full human stature also helps to account for Justice 
Ginsburg’s votes in cases implicating the potential tradeoff between liberty 
and security in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.175 A 
Justice whose basic approach to constitutional law is oriented around the 
ideal of essential human dignity, of full human stature, might be expected 
to respond skeptically to a President’s assertion that there are, in effect, no 
judicially enforceable constitutional limits on his authority to declare 
someone an “enemy combatant” and to indefinitely detain the individual or 
try him before a military commission.176 Such a Justice might also be 
expected to attend to evolving standards of decency in determining whether 
imposition of the death penalty in certain circumstances shows sufficient 
respect for human dignity.177 
To offer just one more example, Justice Ginsburg has herself tied her 
support for what she calls “a comparative perspective in constitutional 
adjudication” to her broader constitutional vision.178 She has criticized the 
“notion that it is improper to look beyond the borders of the United States 
in grappling with hard questions” as “in line with the view of the U.S. 
Constitution as a document essentially frozen in time as of the date of its 
 
 173. In Pinette, Justice Ginsburg endorsed the argument in Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 197-214 (1992), that the “negative 
bar against establishment of religion implies affirmative establishment of secular public 
order.” 515 U.S. at 817. 
 174. For a different perspective from another Democratic appointee on the Court, see Van 
Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 704 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in judgment). “[T]o reach 
a contrary conclusion here, based primarily on the religious nature of the tablets’ text would, 
I fear, lead the law to exhibit a hostility toward religion that has no place in our 
Establishment Clause traditions.” Id. 
 175. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 
557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); 
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
 176. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (quoting relevant public statements of 
Justice Ginsburg). In each of the cases listed in the previous note, Justice Ginsburg voted in 
favor of detainees who alleged that they were being held or tried illegally. 
 177. Justice Ginsburg was in the majority in Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 
(2008), Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 
(2002). 
 178. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. J., U.S. Supreme Court, Speech at the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a 
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication (Feb. 7, 2006) (transcript available 
at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_02-07b-06.html (last visited Feb. 
14, 2009)). 
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ratification.”179 In her view, “U.S. jurists honor the Framers’ intent ‘to 
create a more perfect Union,’ . . . if they read the Constitution as belonging 
to a global 21st century, not as fixed forever by 18th-century 
understandings.”180 Just as the United States has had much to offer the 
world in broadening “a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind”181 to 
include respect for the opinions of “[Human]kind,”182 so Justice Ginsburg 
believes that other countries can help Americans to perfect the Union. They 
can do so, among other ways, by providing different perspectives on who 
ought to count (and how) in (re)constituting “We the People.” “We are the 
losers,” she maintains, “if we neglect what others can tell us about 
endeavors to eradicate bias against women, minorities, and other 
disadvantaged groups.”183 This is because “irrational prejudice and rank 
discrimination are infectious in our world,” and because “. . . the 
determination to counter it, we all share.”184 
This was apparently one of the lessons that Professor Ginsburg 
learned during her stay in Sweden in the early 1960s. It is widely known 
that she learned Swedish and co-authored a book on Swedish judicial 
procedure.185 It is less commonly understood that she also was exposed to 
perspectives that would significantly influence her approach to the problem 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
 182. Ginsburg, supra note 178. 
 183. Ginsburg & Merritt, supra note 83, at 282. 
 184. Id.; see also, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders: The Value of 
a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 329, 
336 (2004) (noting that in her Grutter concurrence, 539 U.S. at 344, she discussed two 
United Nations Conventions that “distinguish between impermissible policies of oppression 
and exclusion, and permissible policies of inclusion”); id. at 337 (forecasting that the Court 
will continue to take a comparative perspective in constitutional litigation in part “in a spirit 
of humility” because, “in Justice O’Connor’s words: ‘Other legal systems continue to 
innovate, to experiment, and to find new solutions to the new legal problems that arise each 
day, from which we can learn and benefit.’” (quoting Sandra Day O’Connor, Broadening 
Our Horizons: Why American Judges and Lawyers Must Learn About Foreign Law, INT’L 
JUD. OBSERVER, June 1997, at 2)). 
 185. See, e.g., Rebecca Mae Salokar, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, in WOMEN IN LAW 78, 80 
(Rebecca Mae Salokar & Mary L. Volcansek eds., 1996) (“Following her clerkship, 
Ginsburg was invited to participate as a research associate on a comparative legal studies 
project funded by the Carnegie Foundation through Columbia University. She seized the 
opportunity to travel to Sweden to study its legal and judicial system and there, by 
coincidence, she witnessed the beginnings of a feminist movement. But the young Mrs. 
Ginsburg was not yet attuned to the legal concerns of women. The comparative studies 
project resulted in two co-authored books on Swedish law, and to this day, Ginsburg 
maintains her academic interest in that country’s laws and judicial system.”). 
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of sex discrimination in America.186 As Cary Franklin explains in an 
important forthcoming article, “Ginsburg derived the anti-stereotyping 
principle in part from the philosophy of John Stuart Mill and the law and 
politics of Sweden, which began in the early 1960s to wage an ambitious, 
decades-long campaign against sex-role enforcement.”187 
Specifically, the Swedish anti-stereotyping ideals that would 
powerfully impact Professor Ginsburg went far beyond insisting on formal 
equality between the sexes. “[J]ämställdhet,” as this Swedish theory of 
gender equality was known, rested on the belief that “sex classifications 
were often necessary in order to break down traditional conceptions of men 
and women’s roles; their aim was not to eliminate formal sex 
classifications but to liberate both sexes from prescriptive sex 
stereotypes.”188 According to Franklin, it was primarily for this reason, and 
not because of strategic considerations or a commitment to formal equality, 
that Professor Ginsburg represented male plaintiffs in several of the cases 
she litigated.189 Justice Ginsburg’s internationalism and her sex 
discrimination jurisprudence are thus tied together in interesting ways—
ways that are integrated by her inclusive constitutional vision. 
B. Reflections on Justice Ginsburg’s Vision 
The foregoing illustrations reveal that Justice Ginsburg uses the 
phrase “equal citizenship stature” in a variety of settings, suggesting that it 
captures ideas that are central to her understanding of the Constitution’s 
objectives. To be sure, she has invoked the phrase most frequently in equal 
protection cases, which may be unsurprising because this is an area of 
constitutional law in which she has been especially concerned to secure 
doctrinal change.190 But as I have endeavored to show, her concern with 
equal citizenship transcends her engagement with the Equal Protection  
 
 
 
 186. See generally Franklin, supra note 86 (arguing that the sex equality revolution 
Ginsburg witnessed in Sweden in the 1960s strongly influenced her approach to sex 
discrimination law in the United States). 
 187. Id. at 4; see id. at 12 (“Ginsburg’s immersion in Swedish law and culture in the 
1960s would have a profound impact on her subsequent career as a legal feminist and 
Supreme Court litigator.”). 
 188. Id. at 17. 
 189. See, e.g., Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Moritz v. Comm’r of 
Internal Revenue, 469 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1972). For an illuminating (and characteristically 
humorous) account of how the Ginsburgs stumbled upon the Moritz case, see Martin D. 
Ginsburg, A Uniquely Distinguished Service, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 173 (2007). 
 190. Cf. Baer, supra note 68, at 222 (“She has actively promoted change, at least in equal 
protection doctrine . . . .”). 
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Clause. She has been applying to several groups and areas of constitutional 
law the same vision that she initially developed in her work as an advocate 
on behalf of women’s rights during the 1970s.191 
The foregoing examples reveal something else that is important about 
Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional vision. She often invokes the ideal of 
equal citizenship stature interchangeably with references to “equal dignity,” 
“essential human dignity,” and “full human stature.” In her public 
utterances, these phrases appear to convey essentially the same meaning. 
This observation permits three further reflections about the content of 
Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional vision. 
First, Justice Ginsburg’s concern with “stature,” or social status, 
indicates that her vision is infused with antisubordination values.192 Her 
primary focus of constitutional concern is on historically marginalized 
groups; she insists that it is wrong for government to reinforce their inferior 
social status.193 In accordance with this insistence, she has sharply 
distinguished between efforts to exclude such groups from institutions or 
opportunities in American society, and efforts to include them by 
overcoming the continuing effects of past (and present) societal 
discrimination and taking relevant differences into account. In equal 
protection cases, she has operationalized this distinction by applying 
vigorous judicial scrutiny only to exclusionary practices, thereby 
destabilizing the doctrinal division of the Equal Protection Clause into 
three tiers of scrutiny. In her view, rigid adherence to the tiers thwarts the 
vindication of antisbordination values, particularly “[t]he moral insistence 
that the low be raised up—that the forces of subordination be named, 
accused, disestablished, and dissolved.”194 
 
 
 
 191. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 50, at 266 (noting that “in the 1970s,” her “major 
work . . . was to help advance the vibrant idea of the equal stature and dignity of men and 
women as a matter of constitutional principle”). 
 192. For discussions of the antisubordination understanding of equal protection, see 
CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 32, 38 (1987); Owen M. Fiss, 
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 151 (1976); Siegel, 
supra note 57, at 1472-76; see also Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil 
Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9 (2003); 
Jill Elaine Hasday, The Principle and Practice of Women’s “Full Citizenship”: A Case 
Study of Sex-Segregated Public Education, 101 MICH. L. REV. 755, 769-79 (2002). 
 193. See Siegel, supra note 57, at 1472-73 (defining “the antisubordination principle” as 
“the conviction that it is wrong for the state to engage in practices that enforce the inferior 
social status of historically oppressed groups”). 
 194. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 192, at 32. 
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While some feminist legal scholars have charged Justice Ginsburg 
with excessive formalism in the area of gender equality,195 the foregoing 
analysis suggests that her constitutional vision is more substantive than 
formal, and always has been. Critically, her selection in 1972 of a pregnant 
plaintiff to advance the equal protection claims of women illustrates that 
she is no formalist.196 In her merits brief in Struck, Ginsburg explained that 
she was challenging laws that reflect or enforce traditional sex-role 
stereotypes because such laws restrict individual opportunity and 
subordinate women: “presumably well-meaning exaltation of woman’s 
unique role in bearing children has, in effect, denied women equal 
opportunity to develop their individual talents and capacities and has 
impelled them to accept a dependent, subordinate status in society.”197 
 
 195. See, e.g., Baer, supra note 68, at 216, 231 (“Fourteen of the [nineteen] cases decided 
since Craig were brought by men. Lower court cases exhibit a similar pattern. The women’s 
won-lost record is better than the men’s; moreover, victories by men do not necessarily 
harm women and may benefit them. But so far men have been the primary beneficiaries of 
the new sexual equality doctrine. Ruth Bader Ginsburg has given no indication that this 
outcome troubles her. She continues to regard sex equality not as requiring the elimination 
of male supremacy, but as a problem of discrimination, of basing decisions on a person’s 
sex.”); David Cole, Strategies of Difference: Litigating for Women’s Rights in a Man’s 
World, 2 L. & INEQUALITY 33, 55 (1984) (“Ginsburg chose to litigate issues that she could 
frame as hurting both men and women, rather than issues, like pregnancy discrimination, 
where the harm fell on women alone. She sought to deny women’s ‘difference;’ this strategy 
both limited her range and increased her chances for success. Ginsburg’s classic argument 
was to insist that women were like men. She sought to show that women were similarly 
situated, but that society had treated them differently because of stereotypical ‘old notions’ 
and ‘archaic assumptions’ about sex roles. . . . Nevertheless, Ginsburg’s assimilationist 
method could not address the entire range of women’s rights issues. Assimilation is most 
obviously an insufficient response to issues of reproductive freedom. In this area, women 
are biologically different, and therefore women must be treated differently to be treated 
equally.”). Justice Ginsburg has herself summarized much of this criticism. See Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg & Barbara Flagg, Some Reflections on the Feminist Legal Thought of the 1970s, 
1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 9, 17 (1989) (Feminist legal scholars “have portrayed the 1970s 
litigation as assimilationist in outlook, insistent on formal equality, opening doors only to 
comfortably situated women willing to accept men’s rules and be treated like men, even a 
misguided effort that harmed more women than it helped.”). Cary Franklin documents (and 
refutes) this criticism at length. See generally Franklin, supra note 86. 
 196. See Siegel & Siegel, supra note 146 (arguing that “Ginsburg was able to perceive 
social subordination in the exclusion of a pregnant woman from military service, even 
though pregnancy had long been understood as the principal physical difference between the 
sexes, because she saw that government regulation was enforcing traditional sex 
stereotypes”). 
 197. Brief for the Petitioner, Struck v. Sec’y of Def., supra note 146, at 38. See id. at 38-
45 (discussing, inter alia, Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873); Muller v. 
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 
U.S. 57 (1961)). 
836 NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:799 
Captain Struck, Ginsburg explained, “was presumed unfit for service under 
a regulation that declares, without regard to fact, that she fits into the 
stereotyped vision of the ‘correct’ female response to pregnancy.”198 
Ginsburg’s concern about the law’s enforcement of traditional sex-role 
stereotypes encompasses a concern about wrongful interference with 
individual opportunity, but it is not a concern about any and all 
differentiation. Rather, she has focused on differentiation with respect to 
certain practices that have long been associated with the subordination of 
women.199 
Fundamentally, antisubordination concerns motivate Justice 
Ginsburg’s approach to the problem of sex discrimination. She thus wrote 
for the Court in the VMI case that sex classifications “may not be used . . . 
to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of 
women.”200 Justice Ginsburg regards the historic subordination of women 
in America as the principal reason to regard with suspicion laws enforcing 
traditional sex-role stereotypes that constrain their opportunities. On those 
occasions when she insists that men and women should be treated 
essentially the same for most purposes, as in the VMI case, it is for reasons 
that are primarily associated with an antisubordination perspective, not a 
commitment to formal equality.201 The same is true of her willingness—
indeed, eagerness—to view men as victims of sex discrimination in certain 
situations.202 
Antisubordination values thus define what constitutional equality is 
for Justice Ginsburg. She does not regard an antisubordination approach as 
an alternative to equality analysis. Rather, she regards antisubordination as 
equality in the sense she celebrates when using the phrases “equal 
citizenship stature” or “equal dignity.” That is, she conceives equality as 
equal standing and respect, and this conception guides her assessment of 
 
 198. Id. at 50-51 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 199. For an argument that Americans have slowly been coming closer to embracing 
Justice Ginsburg’s view of the relationship between pregnancy discrimination and sex 
discrimination, see generally Neil S. Siegel & Reva B. Siegel, Pregnancy and Sex Role 
Stereotyping, From Struck to Carhart, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming November 2009). In 
this essay, Reva Siegel and I argue (among other things) that it is time to reexamine the 
ways we read Geduldig, see supra note 146, in light of both subsequent legal developments 
and what the opinion actually says about the circumstances in which pregnancy 
discrimination does not qualify as unconstitutional sex discrimination. Id. 
 200. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996) (footnote omitted). 
 201. Cf. generally Franklin, supra note 86 (rejecting the formal-equality reading of 
Ginsburg’s approach to the problem of sex discrimination). 
 202. See supra notes 186-189 and accompanying text (discussing Cary Franklin’s work, 
which explains why Professor Ginsburg represented male plaintiffs in some of the sex 
discrimination cases that she litigated during the 1970s). 
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when equality values are implicated. Such guidance is critical in order to 
determine when differentiation implicates equality. This is a key theme of 
the aforementioned passage in her majority opinion in VMI: 
“Inherent differences” between men and women, we have come 
to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for 
denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial 
constraints on an individual’s opportunity. Sex classifications 
may be used to compensate women “for particular economic 
disabilities [they have] suffered,” to “promot[e] equal 
employment opportunity,” to advance full development of the 
talent and capacities of our Nation’s people. But such 
classifications may not be used, as they once were, to create or 
perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of 
women.203 
Because Justice Ginsburg’s conception of equality is infused with 
antisubordination values, it can deal with “[i]nherent differences” between 
the sexes. As noted above, her substantive understanding of equality is 
powerful enough to indict exclusion on the basis of motherhood, including 
in cases of pregnancy, even though pregnancy had long been understood as 
the principal physical difference between the sexes. In contrast to 
discrimination against pregnant women, which Justice Ginsburg always has 
viewed as a paradigmatic form of sex discrimination,204 she likely did not 
devote her litigation efforts to opposing, say, sex-segregated bathrooms 
because separate restrooms for men and women do not implicate basic 
questions about the equal citizenship stature of women.205 
Justice Ginsburg also uses an antisubordination approach to identify 
the perspective from which equality determinations should be made. That 
is, she determines whether equality values are implicated primarily from 
the standpoint of members of historically excluded groups, not principally 
from the perspective of members of included groups—which was the 
 
 203. 518 U.S. at 533-34 (citations and footnote omitted). 
 204. See supra notes 146-149, 196-198 and accompanying text (discussing Justice 
Ginsburg’s views on pregnancy discrimination). 
 205. I am referencing, of course, restroom privacy objections to the Equal Rights 
Amendment. See, e.g., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Fear of the Equal Rights Amendment, 
WASH. POST, Apr. 7, 1975, at A21 (“Separate places to disrobe, sleep, perform personal 
bodily functions are permitted, in some situations required, by regard for individual 
privacy.”). What Ginsburg labeled the “potty issue,” id., “did not die with the ERA. 
Scholars continued to raise the question of segregated bathrooms to highlight the difference 
between race discrimination and sex discrimination. And constitutional law casebooks 
continued to discuss the potty issue, canonizing it as a central question of sex discrimination 
law.” Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, 
Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 947, 957 n.26 (2002) (citation omitted). 
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approach taken by, among many others, the majority in Plessy v. 
Ferguson206 and Bradwell v. Illinois.207 For example, she approached a 
recent pay discrimination case from the perspective of the victim: 
 
 
 206. 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (“We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s 
argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps 
the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything 
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon 
it.”). 
 207. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873) (upholding the exclusion of women from the practice 
of law). In a concurring opinion, Justice Bradley wrote: 
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide 
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. 
Man is, or should be, woman’s protector and defender. The natural and 
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently 
unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the 
family organization, which is founded in the divine ordinance, as well as 
in the nature of things, indicates the domestic sphere as that which 
properly belongs to the domain and functions of womanhood. The 
harmony, not to say identity, of interest and views which belong, or 
should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a 
woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her 
husband. So firmly fixed was this sentiment in the founders of the 
common law that it became a maxim of that system of jurisprudence 
that a woman had no legal existence separate from her husband, who 
was regarded as her head and representative in the social state; and, 
notwithstanding some recent modifications of this civil status, many of 
the special rules of law flowing from and dependent upon this cardinal 
principle still exist in full force in most States. One of these is, that a 
married woman is incapable, without her husband’s consent, of making 
contracts which shall be binding on her or him. This very incapacity was 
one circumstance which the Supreme Court of Illinois deemed 
important in rendering a married woman incompetent fully to perform 
the duties and trusts that belong to the office of an attorney and 
counsellor. 
       It is true that many women are unmarried and not affected by any of 
the duties, complications, and incapacities arising out of the married 
state, but these are exceptions to the general rule. The paramount 
destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil the noble and benign offices 
of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. 
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). “Although the method of 
communication between the Creator and the jurist is never disclosed,” Professor Ginsburg 
wrote in her Struck brief, “‘divine ordinance’ has been a dominant theme in decisions 
justifying laws establishing sex-based classifications.” Brief for the Petitioner, Struck v. 
Sec’y of Def., supra note 146, at 39. 
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The Court’s insistence on immediate contest overlooks common 
characteristics of pay discrimination. Pay disparities often occur, 
as they did in Ledbetter’s case, in small increments; cause to 
suspect that discrimination is at work develops only over time. 
Comparative pay information, moreover, is often hidden from 
the employee’s view. Employers may keep under wraps the pay 
differentials maintained among supervisors, no less the reasons 
for those differentials. Small initial discrepancies may not be 
seen as meet for a federal case, particularly when the employee, 
trying to succeed in a nontraditional environment, is averse to 
making waves.208 
Congress subsequently endorsed the perspective that Justice Ginsburg 
adopted in dissent. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 was the first 
bill that President Obama signed into law.209 
In addition to revealing her commitment to combating subordination, 
Justice Ginsburg’s references to “equal dignity,” “essential human dignity,” 
and “full human stature” are instructive in a second way: she uses the terms 
“citizenship” stature and “human” stature interchangeably. She does not 
mean to include within her vision only United States citizens.210 Rather, she 
seems to invoke the language of citizenship to express the general idea of 
inclusion within the American political community. The difference 
between these two senses of citizenship obviously can have significant 
implications in several areas of American politics and law, including 
 
 208. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2178-79 (2007) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Justice Ginsburg further wrote: 
Pay disparities are thus significantly different from adverse actions 
“such as termination, failure to promote, . . . or refusal to hire,” all 
involving fully communicated discrete acts, “easy to identify” as 
discriminatory. It is only when the disparity becomes apparent and 
sizable, e.g., through future raises calculated as a percentage of current 
salaries, that an employee in Ledbetter’s situation is likely to 
comprehend her plight and, therefore, to complain. Her initial readiness 
to give her employer the benefit of the doubt should not preclude her 
from later challenging the then current and continuing payment of a 
wage depressed on account of her sex. 
Id. at 2179. 
 209. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Signs Equal-Pay Legislation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 
2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/30/us/politics/30ledbetter-web.html. 
 210. For a forceful expression of concern that privileging citizenship would exclude 
many politically and economically vulnerable people, see Rachel F. Moran, Terms of 
Belonging, in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020, supra note 5, at 136 (“As U.S. history shows, 
there are many types of exile from the American dream, whether through expulsion from 
our borders or relegation to second-class status with them. In light of these transgressions, 
progressives’ enthusiasm for citizenship bewilders me.”). 
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terrorism cases211 and immigration cases.212 It also may have significant 
implications should the Court elect to reinvigorate the Privileges Or 
Immunities Clause of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.213 
Noncitizens are hardly invisible to Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional 
vision.214 
Third, Justice Ginsburg’s vision encompasses both an equality and a 
liberty component. As explored above, Justice Ginsburg’s frequent use of 
the term “equal” (and “full” as an apparent synonym for “equal”215) 
captures her aspirational understanding of the Constitution that she 
embraced during her confirmation hearings: those who were previously 
excluded are now to be included within the constitutional conception of 
“We the People.”216 She understands the Civil War Amendments as 
designed to accomplish the great aim of making equal citizens of the 
descendents of slaves and other historically excluded groups.217 
At the same time, Justice Ginsburg’s use of the phrase “essential 
human dignity” appears to imply a floor, an irreducible minimum of 
autonomy that government must accord each person regardless of how it 
 
 211. One issue in cases involving the indefinite detention or trial of alleged enemy 
combatants is whether the citizenship status of the detainee makes any difference to the 
constitutional analysis. See supra note 175 and accompanying text (citing recent terrorism 
decisions by the Court). 
 212. See, e.g., Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 74-97 (2001) (O’Connor, J., joined by 
Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer, JJ., dissenting); Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 460-71 
(1998) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Both decisions upheld provisions of immigration law that 
made it easier for children of single-citizen mothers to become citizens than children of 
single-citizen fathers. 
 213. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. A key question is whether this clause, unlike the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Causes, protects only U.S. citizens. This issue was one of 
the subjects of discussion at a conference sponsored by the American Constitution Society 
during November 2008. See The Second Founding and the Reconstruction Amendments: 
Toward a More Perfect Union, http://www.acslaw.org/secondfounding. 
 214. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 184, at 335 (endorsing Professor Louis Henkin’s use 
of the word “person” rather than “citizen” in discussing human rights because such usage 
“reflect[s] a commitment to respect the individual rights of all human beings”) (discussing 
Louis Henkin, The Constitution as Compact and as Conscience: Individual Rights Abroad 
and at Our Gates, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 32 (1985)). 
 215. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996) (“[T]he Court has 
repeatedly recognized that neither federal nor state government acts compatibly with the 
equal protection principle when a law or official policy denies to women, simply because 
they are women, full citizenship stature—equal opportunity to aspire, achieve, participate in 
and contribute to society based on their individual talents and capacities.” (emphases 
added)). 
 216. See supra notes 71-82 and accompanying text (quoting Justice Ginsburg). 
 217. See supra note 136 (quoting the principal dissent in Parents Involved). 
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treats other persons—a zone of individual freedom into which government 
may not intrude.218 To be sure, she tends to emphasize the ideal of human 
dignity as equality more often than the ideal of dignity as liberty, implying 
that the equality ideal occupies a favored position in her scheme of 
constitutional values. But appropriate focus on this key component of her 
constitutional vision does not imply that the liberty ideal plays an 
insignificant role.219 I note again her observation that the Founders “stated a 
commitment” not only “to equality,” but also “to individual liberty.”220 
More importantly, Justice Ginsburg registers that laws intervening in 
major life decisions and enforcing status roles may simultaneously 
implicate both equality and liberty—equal protection and due process. For 
example, restricting women’s liberty may be a means to the end of 
communicating inequality, and discriminating against women may be a 
means to the end of diminishing their opportunities to make their own  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 218. Justice Ginsburg thus joined (and subsequently invoked) the following language 
from Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lawrence: 
       Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the 
Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components 
of liberty in its manifold possibilities, they might have been more 
specific. They did not presume to have this insight. They knew times 
can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once 
thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the 
Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its 
principles in their own search for greater freedom. 
539 U.S. at 578-79. See Ginsburg, supra note 184, at 336 (highlighting this portion of 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion). 
 219. For example, although Justice Ginsburg views the institution of affirmative action as 
primarily implicating values of constitutional equality, liberty concerns nonetheless inform 
her reasoning in this area of the law. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 276 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“Court review can ensure that preferences are not so large as to trammel unduly 
upon the opportunities of others or interfere too harshly with legitimate expectations of 
persons in once-preferred groups.”). 
 220. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
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meaning of their lives.221 For Justice Ginsburg, it seems less important to 
disentangle these two clusters of constitutional commitments than it is to 
emphasize the ways in which they are connected.222 
Justice Ginsburg’s insistence on equal citizenship stature integrates 
her approaches to several important areas of constitutional law. Her votes 
in potentially distinct cases—those implicating gender discrimination, 
reproductive rights, racial equality, disability rights, federalism, 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, church/state separation, 
terrorism, the death penalty, and international law—are not conceptually 
independent of one another. They are not merely a series of jurisprudential 
“silos.” There is significant depth and coherence to Justice Ginsburg’s 
constitutional jurisprudence, a depth and coherence that is attributable to 
her progressive constitutional vision.223 
 
 221. For development of this insight, see Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of 
Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1738-45, 
1763-66 (2008). “Concern that restrictions on women’s liberty can communicate meanings 
about women’s social standing lies at the heart of the sex discrimination cases, especially 
those cases invalidating laws that deny women autonomy to make decisions about their 
family roles.” Id. at 1744-45. 
 222. Thus, in Struck Professor Ginsburg challenged pregnancy discrimination as violative 
of both equal protection and due process. See supra note 146 and accompanying text. See, 
e.g., Brief for the Petitioner, Struck v. Sec’y of Def., supra note 146, at 52 (“The 
discriminatory treatment required by the challenged regulation . . . reflects the discredited 
notion that a woman who becomes pregnant is not fit for duty, but should be confined at 
home to await childbirth and thereafter devote herself to child care. Imposition of this 
outmoded standard upon petitioner unconstitutionally encroaches upon her right to privacy 
in the conduct of her personal life.”) (footnote omitted). 
 223. One might object that it is possible to share Justice Ginsburg’s concern with the 
historically (or currently) powerless and yet reject her conclusions in specific areas of the 
law. For example, opponents of abortion rights have long insisted on the full human status 
of the fetus. Cf., e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 1634 (2007) (describing an 
“unborn child” as “a child assuming the human form”). I agree that people who are equally 
concerned about the politically disempowered may disagree about the abortion issue itself. 
But I would be loath to conclude that they share a common constitutional vision without 
knowing whether their concern for the vulnerable includes a commitment to the full equality 
of women. And to get at that question, I would want to know their views on, say, 
accommodation of motherhood and accessibility to contraception and sex education. If 
opponents of abortion hold views that compromise women’s equality in these areas as well, 
and if they view coercing childbirth as the only or the primary way to protect the unborn, 
then I would be inclined to conclude that they do not share Justice Ginsburg’s inclusive 
vision. It seems more likely that they possess a different vision and are attempting to 
appropriate feminist frames for distinct normative purposes. For an illustration of social 
movement struggle in this area where one group adopts a powerful frame of its agonist, see, 
for example, Reva B. Siegel, The Right’s Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of 
Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641, 1677-79 (2008) (2007  
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I therefore do not share the concern of some legal academics about 
“the absence of anything like a heroic vision on the Court’s left.”224 For 
reasons I will soon offer, I agree that Justice Ginsburg is not a “visionary” 
in an aggressive sense.225 But as I have shown, Justice Ginsburg does 
possess a heroic constitutional vision. I shall now consider whether the 
aggression of a visionary is what is most required in order to realize her 
vision. 
III. The Pursuit of Justice Ginsburg’s Vision 
Champions of Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional vision are justifiably 
inspired by its clear-sighted series of insistences: that history did in fact 
happen and must be reckoned with in the present; that those who were long 
excluded from the constitutional community must now be included; that the 
ideal of human equality is substantive, not formal, and must be vindicated, 
not betrayed. 
To be persuaded by a constitutional vision, however, is not to 
persuade others to adopt it. And without persuading a majority of one’s 
fellow citizens over a sustained period of time, proponents of a 
constitutional vision cannot prevail in our constitutional politics or our 
constitutional law. The stakes are often high. Right now, for example, 
supporters of President Barack Obama—many of whom presumably share 
much of Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional vision—might ask themselves 
what it will take to ensure that his presidency ends up being as 
consequential as they hope it will be—what is required to make the 
outcome of the 2008 presidential election more like President Roosevelt’s 
victory in 1932 and less like President Carter’s victory in 1976. 
I do not presume that many of President Obama’s supporters share 
Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional vision merely because the two can be 
categorized as “liberals.” Nor do I assume a connection just because the 
very election of Barack Obama as our nation’s forty-fourth President 
 
Brainerd Currie Lecture). For a sketch of how different American society would have to 
look for abortion-restrictive regulation not to rest in substantial part on traditional sex-role 
stereotypes about women, see Siegel, supra note 113, at 366-67. 
 224. Cass R. Sunstein, Where Are the Liberal Visionaries on the Supreme Court?, TNR 
Online, May 15, 2007. Cf. infra note 249 (quoting other legal academics). 
 225. I read Professor Sunstein as suggesting that “genuine visionaries” not only possess a 
constitutional vision, but also seek to realize the vision in a particular way—namely, 
through “sweeping opinions” that throw caution and compromise to the wind. Id. I agree 
that Justice Ginsburg is no visionary in this sense. See infra Part III (discussing Justice 
Ginsburg’s characteristically careful approach to achieving social change through 
constitutional adjudication). 
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partially embodies the power of realizing Justice Ginsburg’s vision.226 
Rather, Justice Ginsburg and President Obama tend to speak about 
American constitutional identity in strikingly similar ways, and they appear 
to have similar ideas about how best to persuade fellow Americans to adopt 
their conception. For example, then-Senator Obama titled his Philadelphia 
speech on American race relations “A More Perfect Union,” and he began 
it by reciting the opening words of the Constitution.227 Justice Ginsburg 
could have uttered much of the aspirational language that followed.228 
Senator Obama noted that the document produced by the Framers 
during the summer of 1787 “was eventually signed but ultimately 
unfinished,” for “[i]t was stained by this nation’s original sin of slavery” 
and left “any final resolution to future generations.”229 This resolution, 
however, “was already embedded within our Constitution—a Constitution 
that had at its very core the ideal of equal citizenship under the law; a 
Constitution that promised its people liberty, and justice, and a union that 
could be and should be perfected over time.”230 Yet fine words on paper did 
not suffice: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 226. I obviously cannot prove such a statement. But I can suggest that it seems a 
promising way to account for the number of Americans who wept on Election Night and the 
following day, including Americans who are not characteristically prone to public displays 
of great emotion. Anyone who doubts the depth and power of Justice Ginsburg’s 
constitutional vision might consider this moment in American history and how many 
Americans of diverse backgrounds experienced it—even some who voted for Senator John 
McCain. 
 227. Senator Barack Obama, Address at the National Constitution Center: A More 
Perfect Union (Mar. 18, 2008) (transcript available at http://my.barackobama.com/page 
/content/hisownwords) (“We the people, in order to form a more perfect union.”). He 
omitted the phrase “of the United States.” See id. 
 228. I do not do sufficient work in this piece to establish that Justice Ginsburg and 
President Obama share the same essential progressive vision of our Constitution. This Part, 
however, offers evidence that suggests substantial similarities in the basic constitutional 
outlooks of this Justice and this President. I recognize, however, that there are also likely to 
be important differences between them. For example, it is not clear how a commitment to 
equal citizenship stature explains some of the Obama Administration’s positions on 
executive power. 
 229. Obama, supra note 227. 
 230. Id. 
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[W]ords on a parchment would not be enough to deliver slaves 
from bondage, or provide men and women of every color and 
creed their full rights and obligations as citizens of the United 
States. What would be needed were Americans in successive 
generations who were willing to do their part—through protests 
and struggle, on the streets and in the courts, through a civil war 
and civil disobedience and always at great risk—to narrow that 
gap between the promise of our ideals and the reality of their 
time.231 
President Obama’s Constitution, like Justice Ginsburg’s, is an 
intergenerational project of making good on the promises that “We the 
People” implicitly made to ourselves and to one another in the beginning—
despite many of our practices—through the ideals we espoused and the 
inclusive language we used. “[T]he true genius of this nation,” Obama 
insisted in Philadelphia, “is that America can change.”232 “What we have 
already achieved gives us hope—the audacity to hope—for what we can 
and must achieve tomorrow.”233 Justice Ginsburg agrees with the President 
not only that “[the] union may never be perfect,” but also that “generation 
after generation has shown that it can always be perfected.”234 Like 
President Obama, moreover, she has elected to emphasize the latter point as 
much as the former, implying (among other things) that there is good 
reason genuinely to love this country and to be proud to be an American. 
As inspiring as this constitutional vision is, it may encounter certain 
vulnerabilities that its proponents ignore at their peril. To be sure, I am in 
no position to make strong claims here, for transforming a constitutional 
vision into a governing reality requires the acumen of a skillful political  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
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leader, particularly a President.235 But my sense that the vulnerabilities I 
perceive are real is strengthened by the fact that a politically astute 
President appears to have recognized and given voice to them. 
A key vulnerability concerns the potential pitfalls of constitutionally 
privileging certain groups over others amidst the appearance and reality of 
scarce resources and opportunities. Advocates of an inclusive vision must 
decide which groups to privilege and why in particular settings, and how to 
negotiate conflicts among them.236 They must also be mindful of how a 
constitutional vision that stresses expanding the locus of constitutional 
concern—that emphasizes including and empowering historically 
marginalized groups—may be received by working-class white Americans 
who live with substantial economic anxiety and who do not feel advantaged 
on account of their race: 
Most working- and middle-class white Americans don’t feel that 
they have been particularly privileged by their race. Their 
experience is the immigrant experience—as far as they’re 
concerned, no one’s handed them anything, they’ve built it from 
scratch. They’ve worked hard all their lives, many times only to 
see their jobs shipped overseas or their pension dumped after a 
 
 235. Keith Whittington has underscored the central role of presidential leadership in the 
articulation of a constitutional vision: 
The presidential office is unique in American politics, and it invites its 
occupant to make expansive claims to the authority to lead the nation. 
Moreover, part of the presidential agenda is likely to involve 
constitutional meaning. The Constitution is foundational in American 
politics, not only in the sense that it establishes the boundaries of legal 
action but also in the sense that it authorizes, invites, and structures 
political activity. An implicit or explicit constitutional discourse comes 
naturally to presidents, not because they are special caretakers of our 
constitutional tradition but because their visions of political leadership 
lead them to push the boundaries of that tradition. The president “tells 
us stories about ourselves, and in so doing he tells us what sort of people 
we are, how we are constituted as a community. We take from him not 
only our policies but our national self-identity.” 
WHITTINGTON, supra note 28, at 19 (quoting MARY E. STUCKEY, THE PRESIDENT AS 
INTERPRETER-IN-CHIEF 1 (1991)). 
 236. The 2008 election cycle offered illuminating instances of potential fault lines. 
Identity politics bitterly divided some supporters of Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton, and 
African-Americans played a significant role in securing the passage of Proposition 8 in 
California. See, e.g., Caitlin Flanagan & Benjamin Schwarz, Editorial, Showdown in the Big 
Tent, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2008, at WK11 (“The struggle for equality—beginning with 
freedom from human bondage . . . —has been so central to African-American identity that 
many blacks find homosexual claims of a commensurate level of injustice frivolous, and 
even offensive.”). 
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lifetime of labor. They are anxious about their futures, and feel 
their dreams slipping away; in an era of stagnant wages and 
global competition, opportunity comes to be seen as a zero sum 
game, in which your dreams come at my expense. So when they 
are told to bus their children to a school across town; when they 
hear that an African American is getting an advantage in landing 
a good job or a spot in a good college because of an injustice that 
they themselves never committed; when they’re told that their 
fears about crime in urban neighborhoods are somehow 
prejudiced, resentment builds over time.237 
If then-Senator Obama had talked about race and inequality in a full-
throated antisubordination register, speaking only on behalf of certain 
groups in American society, it seems far less likely that he would have 
been elected President of the United States. It is noteworthy in this regard 
that Justice Ginsburg has counted propertyless white males among the 
previously excluded groups who achieved inclusion within “We the 
People.”238 It is also noteworthy that she always has emphasized what 
women and men both have to gain by ending the separate spheres tradition 
of subordinating women through sex-role stereotypes.239 
Obama spoke about race from multiple points of view, and regarding 
each of them he carefully distinguished legitimate concerns from misplaced 
or counterproductive hostility and scapegoating.240 He spoke about racial 
 
 237. Obama, supra note 227. 
 238. See supra text accompanying note 81. 
 239. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 50, at 270. 
By enshrining and promoting the woman’s “natural” role as selfless 
homemaker, and correspondingly emphasizing the man’s role as 
provider, the state impeded both men and women from pursuit of the 
very opportunities and styles of life that could enable them to break 
away from traditional patterns and develop their full, human capacities. 
Id. 
 240. See, e.g., Obama, supra note 227 (“[W]e do need to remind ourselves that so many 
of the disparities that exist in the African-American community today can be directly traced 
to inequalities passed on from an earlier generation that suffered under the brutal legacy of 
slavery and Jim Crow.”); id. (“For the men and women of Reverend Wright’s generation, 
the memories of humiliation and doubt and fear have not gone away; nor has the anger and 
the bitterness of those years.”). 
The fact that so many people are surprised to hear that anger in some of 
Reverend Wright’s sermons simply reminds us of the old truism that the 
most segregated hour in American life occurs on Sunday morning. That 
anger is not always productive; indeed, all too often it distracts attention 
from solving real problems; it keeps us from squarely facing our own 
complicity in our condition, and prevents the African-American 
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dialogue and reconciliation as he unblinkingly appreciated “the 
complexities of race in this country that we’ve never really worked 
through—a part of our union that we have yet to perfect.”241 And he spoke 
about interests, values, and identities that unite Americans despite their 
differences.242 
Obama also spoke directly to African Americans, white Americans, 
and all Americans. To African Americans, he insisted that the path to a 
more perfect union means not only “continuing to insist on a full measure 
of justice in every aspect of American life,” but also “binding our particular 
grievances—for better health care, and better schools, and better jobs—to  
 
 
 
 
community from forging the alliances it needs to bring about real 
change. But the anger is real; it is powerful; and to simply wish it away, 
to condemn it without understanding its roots, only serves to widen the 
chasm of misunderstanding that exists between the races. 
Id. 
Just as black anger often proved counterproductive, so have these white 
resentments distracted attention from the real culprits of the middle class 
squeeze—a corporate culture rife with inside dealing, questionable 
accounting practices, and short-term greed; a Washington dominated by 
lobbyists and special interests; economic policies that favor the few over 
the many. And yet, to wish away the resentments of white Americans, to 
label them as misguided or even racist, without recognizing they are 
grounded in legitimate concerns—this too widens the racial divide, and 
blocks the path to understanding. 
Id. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Id. 
I believe deeply that we cannot solve the challenges of our time unless 
we solve them together—unless we perfect our union by understanding 
that we may have different stories, but we hold common hopes; that we 
may not look the same and we may not have come from the same place, 
but we all want to move in the same direction—towards a better future 
for our children and our grandchildren. 
Id. (“It’s a story that hasn’t made me the most conventional candidate. But it is a story that 
has seared into my genetic makeup the idea that this nation is more than the sum of its 
parts—that out of many, we are truly one.”); id. (“[W]orking together we can move beyond 
some of our old racial wounds, and . . . in fact we have no choice if we are to continue on 
the path of a more perfect union.”); id. (“Let us find the common stake we all have in one 
another, and let our politics reflect that spirit as well.”). 
 
 
2009] JUSTICE GINSBURG’S CONSTITUTIONAL VISION 849 
the larger aspirations of all Americans—the white woman struggling to 
break the glass ceiling, the white man whose been laid off, the immigrant 
trying to feed his family.”243 And to white Americans, he urged: 
[T]he path to a more perfect union means acknowledging that 
what ails the African-American community does not just exist in 
the minds of black people; that the legacy of discrimination—
and current incidents of discrimination, while less overt than in 
the past—are real and must be addressed. Not just with words, 
but with deeds—by investing in our schools and our 
communities; by enforcing our civil rights laws and ensuring 
fairness in our criminal justice system; by providing this 
generation with ladders of opportunity that were unavailable for 
previous generations.244 
He suggested that the path to a more perfect union requires “all Americans 
to realize that your dreams do not have to come at the expense of my 
dreams; that investing in the health, welfare, and education of black and 
brown and white children will ultimately help all of America prosper.”245 
For President Obama, as Cass Sunstein has written movingly, 
“reconciliation is change, and it is also what makes change possible.”246 
For reasons of both principle and pragmatism, President Obama’s 
approach may have much to offer Americans who seek to realize 
something like Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional vision by making certain 
claims on the Constitution. Relatedly, the President’s approach is relevant 
to an assessment of the ways in which Justice Ginsburg has (and has not) 
gone about executing her judicial responsibilities. 
As a matter of basic justice and human well-being, progressives are 
right to attend to the social dislocations attending past and present practices 
of subordination. Yet an antisubordination perspective is necessarily a 
group-based perspective, and reifying Americans into discrete groups 
 
 243. Id. Obama’s repeated references to health and health care in the speech help to 
explain his strong commitment to health care reform despite the substantial political risks 
that such legislation entails. Health care appears to be no mere piece of his policy agenda; 
rather, it seems to be a key component of a constitutional vision that stresses full and equal 
citizenship. 
 244. Id. Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (“We consider the 
underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced 
separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, 
it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses 
to put that construction upon it.”). Professor Obama presumably had Plessy (among other 
things) in mind. 
 245. Obama, supra note 227. 
 246. Cass R. Sunstein, The Visionary Minimalist, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 30, 2008, at 
15. 
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misses an important part of how many of them experience themselves and 
their country. Part of what is so powerful about Obama’s message is his 
emphasis on the common national identity that Americans passionately 
share—even if some of their most profound disagreements are about the 
meaning of that very identity.247 A commitment to combating subordination 
is critically important in both constitutional politics and constitutional law, 
but it is not the only relevant commitment. 
Pragmatically, Obama’s approach suggests that effectiveness may at 
times require tying one’s own demands to the demands of others. 
Persuasion may also require changing the subject, at least for a time, from 
areas of intractable disagreement to areas of potential agreement. And 
success may require a degree of moderation, accommodation, and 
compromise with Americans of diverse backgrounds who respond to 
identity-defining conflicts in different ways.248 It may at times be necessary 
to temper the present expression of a vision in order to facilitate its 
eventual (or partial) adoption—or to avoid its repudiation before it has an  
 
 
 
 
 247. As Professor Sunstein observes: 
He is unifying, and therefore able to think ambitiously, because he 
insists that Americans are not different “types” who should see each 
other as adversaries engaged in some kind of culture war. Above all, 
Obama rejects identity politics. He participates in, and helps create, anti-
identity politics. He does so by emphasizing that most people have 
diverse roles, loyalties, positions, and concerns, and that the familiar 
divisions are hopelessly inadequate ways of capturing people’s self-
understandings, or their hopes for their nation. 
Id. 
 248. See id. (“Obama believes that real change usually requires consensus, learning, and 
accommodation.”). Professor Bickel made a related point: 
No society, certainly not a large and heterogeneous one, can fail in time 
to explode if it is deprived of the arts of compromise, if it knows no 
ways of muddling through. No good society can be unprincipled; and no 
viable society can be principle-ridden. But it is not true in our society 
that we are generally governed wholly by principle in some matters and 
indulge a rule of expediency exclusively in others. There is no such neat 
dividing line . . . . Most often, . . . and as often as not in matters of the 
widest and deepest concern, such as the racial problem, both 
requirements exist most imperatively side by side: guiding principle and 
expedient compromise. The role of principle, when it cannot be the 
immutable governing rule, is to affect the tendency of policies of 
expediency. And it is a potent role. 
BICKEL, supra note 31, at 64. 
2009] JUSTICE GINSBURG’S CONSTITUTIONAL VISION 851 
adequate opportunity to succeed. Progressive criticism of Justice Ginsburg 
as too moderate and too cautious a jurist may, at times, fail to register these 
concerns.249 
It is for good reason that Justice Ginsburg, during her time as an 
advocate and then a judge, took a slow, measured, and fundamentally 
dialogic approach to accomplishing social change through constitutional 
litigation. Looking at the matter years later from the perspective of the 
judiciary, she explained that courts are least likely to succeed in bringing 
about major social changes when acting on their own. Rather, she insisted 
that courts are in the best position to succeed when they maintain a 
dialogue with more democratic institutions of government—namely, 
federal and state legislatures and executives, as well as the People 
themselves.250 This was a principal theme of her March 1993 James 
Madison Lecture on Constitutional Law at New York University.251 
 
 249. Cf., e.g., Liptak, supra note 18, at WK4 (“These days, Professor [Geoffrey] Stone 
said: ‘The right side is very bold and very conservative. The liberal side is not bold. They 
are incrementalists. They don’t set the agenda.’”); id. (“The old-school liberal justices were 
simply more ambitious than Justices Breyer and Ginsburg, Professor Eisgruber said.”); 
Sunstein, supra notes 224-225 and accompanying text (recording similar views). 
 250. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 50, at 270 (“The Supreme Court, since the 1970s, has 
effectively carried on in the gender discrimination cases a dialogue with the political 
branches of the government. The Court wrote modestly, it put forth no grand philosophy.”); 
see also Bagenstos, supra note 145, at 50, 56-59 (arguing that Justice Ginsburg’s majority 
opinion in Olmstead “is both a perfect example of this kind of dialogic judicial action and 
evidence for its effectiveness in achieving the goals of social-change-oriented litigators”). 
 251. See Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, supra note 81, at 1198. 
[J]udges play an interdependent part in our democracy. They do not 
alone shape legal doctrine but, as I suggested at the outset, they 
participate in a dialogue with other organs of government, and with the 
people as well. “[J]udges do and must legislate,” Justice Holmes 
“recognize[d] without hesitation,” but “they can do so,” he cautioned, 
“only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions.” 
Measured motions seem to me right, in the main, for constitutional as 
well as common law adjudication. Doctrinal limbs too swiftly shaped, 
experience teaches, may prove unstable. 
Id. at 1204 (footnotes omitted). 
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What Justice Ginsburg has stressed about the efficacy of courts is 
relevant as well to participants in constitutional politics. To underscore 
again, proponents of a constitutional vision can succeed only to the extent 
that they persuade a sufficient number of fellow citizens to embrace their 
vision. And in a large, diverse nation, simply insisting without 
qualification, accommodation, or patience on the fundamental rightness of 
the vision may not be the most effective way to proceed. 
How much and in what contexts proponents of a constitutional vision 
should be prepared to bend their substantive commitments for the sake of 
political persuasiveness, broader appeal, and social solidarity cannot be 
answered at a theoretical level. It is a matter of judgment, timing, and tact 
(among other things), which is to say that it is a matter of statesmanship.252 
Matters of statesmanship are necessarily contestable, and so there will at 
times be cause to question the judgment of a President whom one generally 
supports regarding specific issues.253 But the problem of implementing a 
constitutional vision cannot safely be disregarded by Americans who seek 
to win national elections and (re)elect leaders who must govern a 
heterogeneous nation. 
To be clear, I am not gently implying that Justice Ginsburg’s vision 
should be watered down to relative insignificance because the unvarnished 
version has little chance of prevailing in America. Such a “solution” surely 
would be worse than the potential vulnerabilities I have discussed. But I am 
suggesting that those who seek to advance Justice Ginsburg’s constitutional 
vision should articulate it in ways that will prove persuasive over the long 
run to Americans whose support the vision requires in order to accomplish 
its purposes. Political progressives should be loath to disregard this 
suggestion, just as they should be loath to embrace the view, sometimes 
 
In . . . cases . . . dealing with social insurance benefits for a worker’s 
spouse or family, the decisions did not utterly condemn the legislature’s 
product. Instead, the Court, in effect, opened a dialogue with the 
political branches of government. In essence, the Court instructed 
Congress and state legislatures: rethink ancient positions on these 
questions. Should you determine that special treatment for women is 
warranted . . . we have left you a corridor in which to move. But your 
classifications must be refined, adopted for remedial reasons, and not 
rooted in prejudice about “the way women (or men) are.” 
Id. (footnotes and citation omitted)). 
 252. See generally Siegel, supra note 30 (analyzing statesmanship in the context of 
judging). 
 253. For example, political progressives have articulated forceful criticisms of the Obama 
Administration’s positions on judicial appointments, executive power, equal citizenship for 
gay Americans, and the advisability of investigating alleged wrongdoing by the previous 
administration. 
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expressed in progressive circles, that Justice Ginsburg has been a 
disappointment because she has not tried to move the law to a much greater 
extent (and at a faster pace) than she has. Few progressive constitutionalists 
have accomplished so much.254 
I tender this suggestion in part because President Obama seemed to 
proceed from a similar understanding during the 2008 election cycle and 
demonstrated his capacity to succeed at winning national elections, just as 
Justice Ginsburg before him demonstrated her capacity to alter significantly 
the way that men view women—and themselves. At first glance, this 
President and this Justice may seem like a strange pairing. But they share a 
genuine commitment to the continued emancipation of the historically 
excluded, and they share a quietly cool temperament—a professionalism, a 
deliberativeness—that serves them well in their efforts to realize their 
common commitment. Both are pioneers in a critically important sense, 
and they carry their constitutional vision in their distinct institutional roles 
with the same mindfulness that they must make community with 
Americans who do not share their views. In their typically understated but 
inspiring and often effective ways, President Obama and Justice Ginsburg 
work to earn the trust of these Americans and to win them over. 
 
 
 254. Using language that may prove to be his most quoted legacy, Justice Souter offered 
these words of wisdom just before leaving the Court: 
       Changes in societal understanding of the fundamental 
reasonableness of government actions work out in much the same way 
that individuals reconsider issues of fundamental belief. We can change 
our own inherited views just so fast, and a person is not labeled a stick-
in-the-mud for refusing to endorse a new moral claim without having 
some time to work through it intellectually and emotionally. Just as 
attachment to the familiar and the limits of experience affect the 
capacity of an individual to see the potential legitimacy of a moral 
position, the broader society needs the chance to take part in the 
dialectic of public and political back and forth about a new liberty claim 
before it makes sense to declare unsympathetic state or national laws 
arbitrary to the point of being unconstitutional. The time required is a 
matter for judgment depending on the issue involved, but the need for 
some time to pass before a court entertains a substantive due process 
claim on the subject is not merely the requirement of judicial restraint as 
a general approach, but a doctrinal demand to be satisfied before an 
allegedly lagging legal regime can be held to lie beyond the discretion 
of reasonable political judgment. 
District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2341 
(2009) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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APPRECIATION 
It is not possible for me to discharge my personal debt to Justice 
Ginsburg in the pages of a law review. I shall note here only a few facets of 
the content of her character that have inspired me and that I have 
endeavored to emulate in my own life. Among the qualities that come to 
mind is Justice Ginsburg’s uncommon seriousness of purpose: her 
insistence that the work of the Court comes before everything else, 
including her own ego or those of her clerks.255 Other qualities include her 
capacity to register the basic constitutional values at stake in a case; her 
careful use of language; her focus on the factual record; her practice of 
proceeding with slowness and precision even in the most pressure-filled 
circumstances; her ability to sustain enduring friendships across ideological 
divides; and, above all else, her tremendous inner strength and courage.256 
I also am inspired by—and thankful for—the way that Justice 
Ginsburg has engaged the central constitutional struggle of her career, the 
fight for gender equality. Her approach has informed not only her 
scholarship, advocacy, and opinion writing, but also her relationships with 
people. During the year that I was fortunate to spend in her chambers, she 
never once made me feel that I did not or could not understand the nature 
of the problem of sex discrimination because I am a man. She assumed that 
I wanted to understand and that I could if I actually took the time to listen 
carefully. 
Sex discrimination obviously has harmed women throughout 
American history much more than it has harmed men—even to record such 
an observation is to risk trivializing the experience of women. But Justice 
Ginsburg has made clear through her words and deeds that the problem  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 255. “RBG” is not one to expend energy on sparing her clerks’ feelings in correcting their 
errors of law or fact. But at the same time, she responds with gratitude, not defensiveness, 
on those rare occasions when her clerks save her from error. For her, it is all about the work. 
 256. The Justice’s physical appearance can deceive those who do not know her. True 
strength and courage cannot be measured in pounds. She is one of the toughest people I 
have ever encountered. 
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affects all of us and must be addressed by all of us.257 When an adoring 
female visitor to chambers once remarked to Justice Ginsburg that her 
“feminist” girlfriends just loved the Justice for what she had done for 
American women, the Justice replied to the effect that she hoped the 
visitor’s male friends loved her as well. I often think of this episode in 
moments when I am mindful of how fulfilling it is to be a present father. 
I am thankful to Associate Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg for many 
things. But most of all, I am grateful that my two young daughters will 
inhabit a Union that has been perfected in part by the work she has done. 
 
 
 257. See, e.g., Ginsburg, supra note 77, at xii (endorsing “Susan B. Anthony’s ultimate 
vision: ‘man and woman working together to make the world the better for their having 
lived’”) (quoting LYNN SHERR, FAILURE IS IMPOSSIBLE: SUSAN B. ANTHONY IN HER OWN 
WORDS 305 (1995)); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975) (declaring 
unconstitutional a provision of the Social Security Act that allowed a woman whose 
husband died to receive benefits based on his earnings but did not allow a man whose wife 
died to receive benefits based on her earnings). Justice Ginsburg has described Wiesenfeld 
as “a case near and dear to my heart.” Ruth Bader Ginsburg, quoted in CAMPBELL, supra 
note 86, at 93. This is perhaps because her client was a man who was ready, willing, and 
able to raise his child in a society that considered him perverse for wanting to do what had 
long been deemed “women’s work.” 
